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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Misguided Instructions:  
 
Do Jurors Accurately Understand The Law In Death Penalty  
 
Trials? 
 
by 
 
Chasity Stoots-Fonberg 
 
 
The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees individuals’ right to trial by an 
impartial jury. However, empirical research indicates that the jury system is flawed, 
especially regarding judicial sentencing instructions. More specifically, jurors frequently 
misunderstand or misinterpret State-patterned instructions. On a more encouraging note, 
there is evidence that comprehension of jury instructions can be improved. Thus, this 
research assessed improvement in juror comprehension using revised sentencing 
instructions. For the current investigation, participants included 201 volunteers called for 
jury duty in Western Tennessee. Data were generated via a questionnaire that allowed for 
the collection of information relating to participants’ understanding of the sentencing 
instructions. Findings suggest that comprehension is low when jurors are only exposed to 
instructions written by the State. Furthermore, when jurors were given a more detailed 
explanation of certain problematic terminology, comprehension significantly increased. 
Policy implications of this research and directions for future improvement are discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 The majority of states that permit executions allow jurors to decide whether or not 
to impose a sentence of death (Diamond, 1993; Gillers, 1980; Hans, 1988). The role of 
the jury in a criminal trial is to decipher the facts from the evidence and then to apply the 
law to those facts (Luginbuhl & Howe, 1995) while maintaining a level of impartiality 
that meets the guidelines of the U.S. Constitution (Blankenship, Luginbuhl, Cullen, & 
Redick, 1997). The appropriate law is given to the jurors through instructions from the 
judge prior to the jury's deliberations; thus, judicial instructions play a critical role in the 
outcome of a trial. Specifically, the importance of this role is magnified in the sentencing 
phase of a capital trial, the point at which the jury has the ultimate moral decision: 
whether a defendant will live or die. In 1966, Kalven and Zeisel captured the importance 
of the juror system: 
 The Anglo-American jury is a remarkable political institution...[which]  
 represents a deep commitment to the use of laymen in the administration 
 of justice....It opposes the cadre of professional, experienced judges with 
 this transient, ever-changing, ever-inexperienced group of amateurs. The 
 jury is thus by definition an exciting experiment in the conduct of serious 
 human affairs, and it is not surprising that, virtually from its inception, it 
 has been the subject of deep controversy, attracting at once the most extra- 
 vagant praise and the most harsh criticism (p. 3). 
  
 Juror responsibility for sentencing decisions in capital cases has been subjected to 
increasing inquiry during the past several decades. Much of this attention has been 
directed at juror’s understanding of judicial instructions (Blankenship et al., 1997; Frank 
& Applegate, 1998). Since the United States Supreme Court decision in Gregg v Georgia 
(1976), efforts to attain a procedurally just system of capital punishment have focused on 
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the use of judicial instructions to reduce juror bias or caprice (Haney & Lynch, 1994).  
The jury system, in a civil or criminal case, is founded on the assumption of the 
plausibility of informing laypersons about proper legal standards to apply to a set of facts. 
Further, the system is grounded on the supposition that these laypersons are sufficiently 
prepared to deliver an informed decision about the guilt or innocence of an accused 
defendant and, in death penalty cases, the punishment to be imposed (Severance & 
Loftus, 1982; Weltner, 1979). However, if jurors are incapable of understanding the 
instructions or if they elect to ignore them and impose their own standards, the process of 
having jurors render such essential decisions must be questioned.  
 
The Death Penalty Process in Tennessee 
 In the 1970s, Supreme Court decisions addressed the process necessary for 
determining which convicted defendants should be executed. The court in Furman v 
Georgia (1972) concluded that state sentencing systems did not provide protection 
against inconsistent and arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, thus, beginning a 
moratorium on death sentences. Subsequent to this decision, state legislatures enacted a 
variety of statutes intended either to eradicate juror discretion or to impose structure 
(Sandys, 1995).   
 In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court permitted guiding jurors' discretion in Gregg v 
Georgia, Profitt v Florida, and Jurek v Texas. This model of "guided discretion" was 
implemented through the use of judicial instructions. At the start of penalty deliberations, 
judges give capital juries a series of issues or factors to consider in reaching their 
sentencing decision (Haney & Lynch, 1994). The judicial instructions serve a number of 
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functions: the judge orients jurors in their task, outlines the undisputed facts and issues of 
the case, explains the relevant law, and informs jurors about procedural matters 
(McBride, 1969). Specifically, the Gregg plurality noted that where a sentencing body 
has discretion to take or spare a life, "that discretion must be suitably directed and limited 
so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action" (McBride, p. 189). 
Moreover, the jury must be "given guidance regarding the factors about the crime and the 
defendant that the State, representing organized society, deems particularly relevant to 
the sentencing decision" (McBride, p. 192). 
 In contrast to the guided discretion model, some states made death mandatory for 
specified crimes (Weisberg, 1984); however, this model was rejected in Woodson v North 
Carolina and Roberts v Louisiana, decided with Gregg, Profitt, and Jurek. Specifically, a 
plurality of the Court held that a statute mandatorily imposing capital punishment for 
specified crimes is virtually unconstitutional by definition because it treats those 
convicted of a crime "as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to 
the blind infliction of the penalty of death" (Woodson v North Carolina, 1976, p. 304). 
Further, the Court affirmed that "death is different" from other types of punishments; thus 
the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. constitution standard of "individualized justice" could 
not be met when states imposed mandatory sentences (Blankenship et al., 1997).  In other 
words, this option directed the jury's discretion so narrowly that there was limited 
discretion available for the jury to exercise (Tiersma, 1995).   
 As a result of the Georgia, Florida, and Texas cases, the U.S. Supreme Court 
based its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence governing capital punishment on two 
fundamental principles. The first principle of "guided discretion" required that the 
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sentencer's discretion be narrowly guided as to which circumstances subject a defendant 
to the imposition of the death penalty. The second principle of "individualized 
consideration" mandated that the sentencer be allowed to consider all evidence 
concerning the offender as well as the offense that might argue for a sentence other than 
death. These principles of guided discretion and individualized consideration contain 
almost the entire foundation upon which the Court has constructed its framework of 
constitutional rules regulating capital punishment (Sundby, 1991). 
 To avoid treating defendants as an "undifferentiated mass," the sentencer should 
focus not only on the nature of the crime itself but also on defined characteristics of the 
defendant and the case (Blankenship et al., 1997). In most states, these issues are known 
as mitigating factors if they suggest a more lenient penalty and as aggravating factors if 
they support the imposition of the death penalty, factors that jurors were compelled to 
consider before rendering a death sentence. In considering these factors, the 
implementation of capital sentencing discretion is to be guided and thus ostensibly freed 
of constitutionally impermissible caprice, arbitrariness, and discrimination (Bowers, 
Sandys, & Steiner, 1998).   
 
General Application 
 The specifics surrounding the utilization of aggravators and mitigators vary 
according to state. The state of Georgia uses a "threshold" statute that requires the jury to 
find at least one statutorily defined aggravating circumstance before it can impose a death 
sentence. Florida's "balancing" statute requires juries to "weigh" aggravating 
circumstances against mitigating circumstances; if the former outweigh the latter, the jury 
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may impose a sentence of death. Tennessee uses a combination-the jury must find at least 
one aggravating circumstance and then must determine if any mitigating circumstance or 
circumstances exist that outweigh the aggravating circumstance. If no aggravating 
circumstance exists or if a mitigating circumstance or circumstances outweigh the 
aggravating circumstance, then the jury must return a life sentence. Texas uses a third 
variation of guided discretion statutes, first by limiting death to those that meet 
enumerated aggravating circumstances and then by directing the jury to answer three 
special issues: future dangerousness, culpability, and mitigating circumstances, before a 
sentence of death can be meted out.   
 The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the Texas capital 
sentencing statute in Jurek v Texas, in which the defendant was convicted of capital 
murder for killing a 10 year old girl committed during the course of a kidnapping and 
attempted rape. Because the offense was one of the specified capital crimes listed in 
Texas' sentencing statute, the trial court instructed the jury to determine the defendant's 
punishment based solely on the answers to the two relevant special issues, with the third 
issue being deemed non-relevant. A unanimous jury answered both issues in the 
affirmative and, accordingly, the judge sentenced the defendant to death (Jurek v Texas, 
1976, p. 267-268). 
 Subsequently, the defendant appealed all the way to the Supreme Court, arguing 
that post-Furman changes in Texas' sentencing statute were "no more than cosmetic in 
nature and ha[d] in fact not eliminated the arbitrariness and caprice of the system held in 
Furman  to violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments"  (Furman v Georgia, 1972, 
p. 274). Examining the statute in light of the contending principles articulated in Furman 
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and the mandatory sentencing cases, the Court reasoned that the "constitutionality of the 
Texas procedures turns on whether the enumerated questions, or special issues, allow 
consideration of particularized mitigating factors" (Jurek v Texas, 1976 p. 272). 
Specifically, the Court examined the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' interpretation of 
the second special issue to resolve this critical question. The Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals had "indicated that it will interpret the second question so as to allow a 
defendant to bring to the jury's attention whatever mitigating circumstances he may be 
able to show" (p. 273). Based on this broad interpretation of the second issue, the 
Supreme Court concluded that "the Texas capital-sentencing procedure guides and 
focuses the jury's objective consideration of the particularized circumstances of the 
individual offense and the individual offender before it can impose a sentence of death" 
(Jurek v Texas, 1976, p. 273-74). As a result, the Texas sentencing statute did not violate 
the requirements of the Eighth Amendment.   
 Lockett v Ohio (1978) further examined the issue by distinguishing its decision in 
Jurek by noting that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had broadly interpreted the 
second special issue in the Texas sentencing statute. Unlike the Ohio statute, which 
limited the number of mitigating factors the sentencer could consider, the broad scope of 
Texas' second special issue did not "prevent the sentencer [in Jurek] from considering 
any aspect of the defendant's character and record or any circumstances of his offense as 
an independently mitigating factor" (p. 604). Thus, although the composition of the Ohio 
and Texas capital sentencing statutes was similar, the Court's refined Eighth Amendment 
interpretation in Lockett did not affect the facial constitutionality of the Texas statute.  
Lockett further declared off-limits any effort to limit the evidence a defendant could 
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present as a defense to the death penalty so long as the evidence touched upon the 
defendant's character or the nature of the offense. 
 
Tennessee's Application 
 Subsequent to the preceding decisions, Tennessee, like most states, now uses a 
bifurcated trial procedure in capital cases. During the first phase, the jury listens to the 
evidence presented and makes a decision regarding the defendant's guilt. If the verdict 
results in a first-degree murder conviction, the jury then receives additional evidence 
presented in the penalty phase of the trial. The state introduces evidence of aggravating 
circumstances that focus on specific characteristics of the defendant or on elements of the 
murder. Next, the defense presents evidence of mitigating circumstances that concentrate 
on the defendant's characteristics or on the circumstances surrounding the murder.  
Mitigating factors affect the degree of punishment to be imposed on a defendant 
convicted of a crime; however, they do not lessen the severity of the crime. After 
testimony has concluded, the jury then receives instructions from the presiding judge, 
which are based on Tennessee's criminal code (Blankenship et al., 1997). 
 The judicial instructions command the jury to ascertain if an aggravating 
circumstance exists. If the jury finds the presence of one or more aggravators, the 
instructions then require the jury to determine if one or more mitigators exist that 
"outweigh" the aggravating circumstances. Consequently, Tennessee follows the pattern 
set forth by the Florida ruling of weighing or balancing aggravators against mitigators.  
Then, if it is found that no mitigators exist or that a mitigator exists but does not outweigh 
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the aggravators, the jury is mandated to impose a sentence of death (Blankenship et al., 
1997). 
 Aggravating circumstances are enumerated or specified in the instructions given 
to the jury during the second stage of a capital trial (see Appendix A). Jurors are 
prohibited, according to the Tennessee statute, from considering nonenumerated, or 
"unwritten," aggravating circumstances. Examples of mitigating circumstances are 
provided in the instructions as well (see Appendix A); whereby, jurors are also free to 
consider nonenumerated mitigating factors (Lockett v Ohio, 1978). In conclusion, 
Tennessee juries are instructed to follow methodical measures in resolving the existence 
of aggravating and/or mitigating circumstances, and the weight given to the 
circumstances (Blankenship et al., 1997).   
 As for the presence of aggravating factors, the state maintains the burden of 
proving their existence. Thus, the state is held to the highest legal standard, proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt beyond a moral certainty, and unanimity of the jury. However, the 
standard of proof and the presence or absence of jury unanimity concerning the existence 
of mitigating factors is omitted from the Tennessee sentencing instructions, even though 
the importance of this criteria was set forth in Mills v Maryland (1988) as well as in 
McKoy v North Carolina (1990). The Court held that the sentencing instructions must 
state clearly to jurors that mitigating factors need not be found unanimously (Blankenship 
et al., 1997). Specifically, McKoy concluded that by requiring unanimity, jurors are 
constricted in considering mitigators and this contradicts Mills, which states that the 
sentencer must be able to consider all mitigating evidence.   
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 If a mitigator is found to exist, the sentencing instructions require jurors to weigh 
that circumstance against the aggravating circumstance. Again, however, the Tennessee 
instructions do not include any direction on how jurors are to go forward in the process of 
weighing. More importantly, according to the instructions, jurors must be unanimous in 
determining if a mitigating circumstance outweighs the aggravating circumstance, but the 
jury does not have to yield unanimity as to whether or not a mitigator exists. Thus, 
confusion may exist as to whether or not unanimity must exist. 
 
Statement of the Problem 
 As is evidenced above by the lengthy history of U.S. Supreme Court precedent, 
the specifics of a juror's duty to defendants in a capital case can be mystifying, thus 
resulting in life changing decisions based on something other than facts guided by laws. 
Jurors may be quite competent at sorting out the facts, but they have a difficult time 
understanding the judge's instructions, which often results in omitting crucial distinctions 
(Reifman, Gusick, & Ellsworth, 1992). Study after study has shown that jurors do not 
understand the law they are given, often performing, at best, at chance level on objective 
tests of comprehension (Buchanan, Pryor, Taylor, & Strawn, 1978; Charrow & Charrow, 
1979; Ellsworth, 1989; Elwork, Sales, & Alfini, 1977, 1982; Forston, 1975; Frank & 
Applegate, 1998; Garvey, Johnson, & Marcus, 2000; Haney & Lynch, 1994; Hastie, 
Penrod, & Pennington, 1983; Kaplan & Kemmerick, 1974; Kassin & Wrightsman, 1979; 
Kerr et al., 1976; Luginbuhl, 1992; Severance & Loftus, 1982; Steele & Thornburg, 
1988; Strawn & Buchanan, 1976; Wiener, Pritchard, & Weston, 1995). Juries making 
capital punishment decisions must accurately understand legal instructions if they are to 
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perform their duties properly. The U.S. Supreme Court overlooks juror fallibility in light 
of overwhelming contradicting evidence that jurors often do not understand these 
instructions. For example, jurors often do not know what constitutes a mitigating factor 
and how one is to be considered in the scheme of the sentencing process. Prior research 
has suggested that jurors are unable to consistently apply the appropriate legal standard 
for concluding the existence of mitigating circumstances (Blankenship et al., 1997; 
Eisenberg & Wells, 1993; Haney & Lynch, 1994; Luginbuhl, 1992; Tiersma, 1995).   
 The current research (referred to as second sample or revised sample) is a follow-
up to the first sample (referred to as the original sample) used in the study, which was 
completed by Blankenship at al. (1997) in Shelby County, Tennessee. In that study, 
sample one, a questionnaire was administered to volunteers who had been summoned for 
jury duty in that county. Three jury pools were sampled giving a total sample of 495 
usable questionnaires. Included in the questionnaire were the sentencing instructions 
provided by the state of Tennessee, as well as scenarios to test five different areas of 
comprehension. Blankenship et al. found that overall jurors did not understand the 
instructions put forth to them. 
 Thus, the focus of the current research was to determine if jurors' level of 
comprehension of sentencing instructions can be improved by using revised sentencing 
instructions instead of the original instructions given by the state. The second sample in 
the study was designed to evaluate jurors' comprehension level of revised (sample two) 
sentencing instructions (see Appendix B) compared to the level of jurors' understanding 
of the original (sample one) sentencing instructions, conducted by Blankenship et al., 
1997. Specifically, the research focused on the ability of jurors to: differentiate the 
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requirement of jury unanimity for mitigating circumstances; ascertain the unanimity 
requirement for weighing mitigating circumstances against aggravating circumstances; 
comprehend the instructions for finding non-enumerated mitigating circumstances; 
understand the level of proof required for mitigating circumstances; and understand the 
requirement for weighing mitigating circumstances against aggravating circumstances.    
 A set of scenarios was used to measure each of the five concepts to determine 
comprehension level of the judicial sentencing instructions (see Appendix C). 
Proportions were calculated for each scenario for each possible answer, "yes," "no," and 
"don't know." Then, a z-score was calculated for the correct answer from both waves of 
the study for each scenario to determine if an improvement was significant or simply a 
chance improvement.  
 
Limitations of the Study 
 Although this research provides valuable insights into the effects of juror 
misunderstanding of capital sentencing instructions by jury panels, a number of potential 
limitations were recognized. First, although the sample was derived from prospective 
jurors who had been called for duty, the participants did not actually deliberate as actual 
jurors. As such, they were not subjected to the constraints of being part of the 
adjudication process and likely had less information about the defendants discussed in the 
scenarios than most jurors have in the sentencing phase of an actual capital trial (Hans, 
1988; Severance & Loftus, 1982). 
 Due to the reticence of the jury process, researchers still do not have a complete 
understanding of the experience for actual jurors. Thus, given the minimal understanding 
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of the death penalty decision process, it can be difficult to generalize from the findings of 
an experimental simulation. In the end, though, the generalizability of interview or 
simulation studies is an empirical question that can only be affirmed via continuing 
research that can clearly and effectively establish the respresentativeness of findings 
(Costanzo & Costanzo, 1992). However, according to Cook and Campbell (1979), this 
issue alludes to the principle of external validity, referring to the ability to generalize 
findings to other times, geographic locations, or populations. Because the Shelby County 
jury pool was randomly selected, the researchers had the ability to infer from the sample 
to the population of all jurors in Shelby County, but generalizing to other jurisdictions 
may not be plausible.   
 Despite these potential limitations, the current study provided evidence that juror 
understanding of pattern instructions was lacking and that understandability can be 
improved. As such, the findings presented here question whether the discretion of jurors 
is being sufficiently guided as the Supreme Court implied in its earlier findings (Gregg v 
Georgia, 1976; Jurek v Texas, 1976; Profitt v Florida, 1976).   
 
Importance of the Study 
 The responsibility of capital juries is monumental. These individuals are expected 
to subsequently make a decision as to whether or not the accused will live or die. 
Therefore, with such a burdensome decision put upon these common laypersons, the least 
that can be expected are instructions that adequately direct the individuals' towards 
reaching the most just verdict. In some cases in jurisdictions in which the judges give 
jurors written instructions, aside from other exhibits, the instructions will be the only 
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tangible thing the jurors take with them into the deliberation room (Greene, 1986). 
However, most jurors view the judge as the embodiment of impartial justice (Dombroff, 
1985) and consequently attach immense significance to the instructions. As such, the 
underlying assumption is that the instructions effectively communicate the legal rules to 
the jurors (Imwinkelried & Schwed, 1987). 
 Therefore, the importance of the current study is quite significant in that it sheds 
light on the naivete of that assumption by many court officials and legislators. 
Specifically, the research identified intricacies of the Tennessee judicial sentencing 
instructions that were impacting many defendants and their ability to receive a fair and 
unbiased trial according to the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. constitution. In short, the 
current study revealed that when the instructions were poorly worded or vague, or when 
serious omissions concerning the law existed, jurors' comprehension was significantly 
limited. Thus, in actual Tennessee capital cases, death sentences may have been inflicted 
unconstitutionally (Blankenship et al., 1997). However, the current research suggests that 
comprehension can be improved, but not perfectly. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
 
The Historical Context of Juries 
 According to the law of the English, the Magna Carta has emerged as a document 
of importance since it was first issued by King John on June 15, 1215 (Moore, 1973). 
This instrument has commonly been credited with guaranteeing trial by jury. Originally 
“juries” were used to pry facts out of citizens who were believed to be withholding 
information about criminal activity (Gleisser, 1968). King’s Courts were established 
where citizens were required to report crimes committed in the area. “Jurors” were 12 
men in the area who were most likely to know the facts involved (McCart, 1965).  
 Gradually the trial system changed to the form used today. Instead of jurors’ 
being “qualified” because they were to a degree familiar with the facts, they became 
“qualified” because they did not know the facts (McCart, 1965). A long struggle had 
progressed to secure jury trials in order to assure impartial trials for those charged with 
committing crimes. Likewise, the struggle continued when the English colonists carried 
their system of justice to the New World (McCart).  
 The right to trial by jury was specifically mentioned in King James I's Instructions 
for the Government of the Colony of Virginia on November 20, 1606; whereby, all 
capital crimes, including but not limited to, major disturbances, rebellion, and conspiracy, 
were to be tried by juries. Subsequently, trial by jury was then introduced into the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony by 1628 (Moore, 1973). In addition, the Supreme Court of the 
United States in 1898 stated that, "When Magna Carta declared no freeman should be 
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deprived of life, etc., but by the judgment of his peers or by the law of the land, it referred 
to a trial by twelve jurors" (Thompson v Utah, 1898). 
 After reaching America, two significant events occurred that effected a radical 
change in the trial system. The first event was when John Peter Zenger was prosecuted 
and persecuted in New York City in 1734. Zenger was arrested for publishing libelous 
articles against the governor. At the trial, the judge instructed the jury to decide whether 
the publication had taken place and then he would decide whether the writing was 
libelous. The jury defied the judge and returned a verdict of not guilty. The action was 
applauded by the Colonists, ending judicial domination (McCart, 1965). 
 The second event came with the writings of Sir William B. Blackstone who wrote 
a complete textbook of the common law in 110 sections. It was published in three 
volumes and the first was issued in 1765. For the first time, an authoritative statement of 
the principles of common law, which traced the laws to the roots of their development, 
existed. Moreover, the Commentaries were used before and after the writing of the 
Declaration of Independence and it also must be given credit for assisting the Founding 
Fathers in drafting the Federal Constitution (McCart, 1965).  
 A guarantee of the right to jury trial in criminal cases was placed into most of the 
state constitutions adopted during the American Revolution (Gleisser, 1968). It is largely 
because of state constitutions that the right of jury trial continues in state courts. Most 
lawyers, however, state that the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, which prohibits a state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law, does not require the state to provide a jury trial even 
in felony cases (Gleisser).  
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In fact, juries have nearly completely disappeared in England, have been greatly 
modified in France and Germany, are under way towards elimination in Scotland, have 
been wiped out in India, and Israel never had them at all (Gleisser, 1968). Reasons for the 
elimination and modification of the jury trial are numerous. They include the cost and 
time of juries in civil trials; the uncertainty of a trial by jury compared to trial by judge; a 
problem with jurors’ ignoring the law and imposing a sentence as they saw fit; and 
limited education of the participating jurors. France created juries that must meet new 
qualifications: being over 30 years of age and have the ability to read and write. 
 Nonetheless, the last major nation to staunchly defend the value of juries and to 
oppose reforms in selecting jurors is America. It is in America that most of the emphasis 
is placed upon difficulties with judges rather than turning the spotlight on the 
inadequacies of the jurors (Gleisser, 1968). However, Gleisser addressed the urgency that 
if the jury system is to continue some changes must be brought about, either by selection 
of better jurors in general or by changing the methods by which jurors sit briefly and are 
dismissed before they can even learn the bare essentials of their assignment. 
 In the years preceding 1972, juries across the U.S. were generally given a large 
amount of discretion with almost no guidance in determining whether a convicted 
defendant was sentenced to death (Nakell & Hardy, 1987); thus, necessitating the 
creation of individualized sentencing schemes. Even the construction of juries 
contributed significantly to the arbitrary application of the death penalty during this time. 
The process of selecting a jury was biased in that the methods of jury selection excluded 
certain members of society. After the ruling was pronounced in 1940 in Smith v Texas, 
wherein, the U.S. Supreme Court declared the need to make the jury a "body truly 
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representative of the community," (Smith v Texas, 1940, p. 130) prejudiced practices 
continued. 
 Throughout time the prejudiced practices of impaneling juries have continued. 
Instead of random selection, jury commissioners typically selected the names of "men of 
recognized intelligence and probity" from notables or "key men" of the community. As 
late as 1967, a survey reported that 60% of federal courts still relied significantly on this 
key man system for the selection of jurors (Abramson, 1994). Not until 1975 did the U.S. 
Supreme Court impart the ideal of the cross-sectional jury to state courts, ruling that the 
very meaning of the constitutional guarantee of trial by an impartial jury required that the 
jury pool be representative of the eligible community population (Taylor v Louisiana, 
1975, p. 528).  
 
Post-Furman Arbitrary Application of the Death Penalty 
 In 1972, by a 5-4 vote, Furman invalidated nearly every death-sentencing statute 
in place in the United States. Furman held that all the statutes were arbitrary and possibly 
discriminatory and, thus, violated the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth 
Amendment. However, in 1987 the McCleskey decision, which was also decided by a 5-4 
vote, repudiated a claim of arbitrariness and discrimination in the administration of 
Georgia's post-Furman death sentencing system. In the process, any hope was abolished 
that the United States Constitution would be interpreted to require equal justice in the 
administration of the death penalty system.  
 Although the five concurring justices in Furman did not conclusively agree 
whether racially discriminatory sentencing had actually occurred in the past, Furman 
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certainly suggested that death-sentencing procedures could create an intolerable risk of 
discriminatory sentences. In this respect, however, the United States Supreme Court's 
post-Furman opinions are less explicit (Baldus, Woodworth, & Pulaski, 1990). It was not 
until 1986 in the Turner v Murray decision that the Court gave any special consideration 
to sentencing decisions that may have been tainted by race or other impermissible factors.  
 Between 1972 and 1976, 35 states enacted new death penalty statutes that aspired 
to make death penalty decisions routine instead of random. Different states attacked the 
problems in Furman from various angles. For example, North Carolina and Louisiana 
abolished jury discretion and mandated the death penalty for specific crimes such as 
murder of a police officer, murder for hire, or murder committed during a felony 
(Abramson, 1994). Other states, led by Georgia, Florida, and Texas, preserved the judge's 
or jury's discretion in making the final decision but attempted to narrow the exercise of 
discretion by legislating standards for the death sentencer to apply. From this, in 1976 the 
U.S. Supreme Court constructed a two-pronged process (Abramson). The first prong, still 
prevalent today, was the requirement of "individualized sentencing" in death penalty 
cases. With each case being unique, the Courts were required to consider defendants as 
individuals and, thus, tailor the punishment accordingly. Consequently, mandatory death 
sentences were considered unconstitutional.  
 The second prong, declined as far as importance since 1976, was the principle of 
treating like cases alike. Following this, the Court attempted to shift its focus from 
individualized justice to more consistent justice (Abramson, 1994). The Court 
emphasized the importance in treating similar cases with similar crimes in a more 
symmetrical fashion.  
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Death Qualification of Jury 
 With the increased public awareness and debate over capital punishment in the 
past couple of decades, researchers have focused their attention on potential bias of 
capital juries (Luginbuhl, 1992). Capital jurors differ from the general community and 
from jurors in other cases. This is due in large part because death penalty jurors must 
undergo death qualification (Hans, 1988), which occurs during jury selection. It has been 
revealed that the death-qualification process itself biases jurors into thinking that the 
defendant is guilty (Haney, 1984). In addition to routine questions about attitudes and 
personal experiences relevant to the case, prospective capital jurors are asked if they will 
be able to consider a death sentence if the defendant is found guilty of a capital crime. 
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1985 that potential jurors whose beliefs "substantially 
impair" their ability to impose a death sentence should be removed from jury service 
(Wainwright v Witt, 1985). This standard replaced the previous one set forth in 
Witherspoon v Illinois (1968), which stated that only those persons who were unalterably 
opposed to the death penalty were excluded. Judges often dismiss potential jurors who 
display attitudes that interfere with their ability to follow the law. Moreover, prosecuting 
and defense attorneys challenge and attempt to remove jurors who they perceive to be 
unsympathetic to their case (Costanzo & White, 1994). 
 Various other studies have shown that death-qualified jurors have an increased 
likelihood of convicting a capital defendant over non-death-qualified jurors (Bronson, 
1970; Cowan, Thompson, & Ellsworth, 1984; Goldberg, 1970; Jurow, 1971; Luginbuhl, 
Kadane, & Powers, 1991). Further, Luginbuhl and Middendorf (1988) found that death-
qualified jurors were more persuaded by aggravating circumstances and less persuaded 
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by mitigating circumstances than were non-death-qualified jurors. Their findings were 
akin to those of Thompson, Cowan, Ellsworth, and Harrington (1984) who determined 
that death-qualified jurors tend to support the prosecution rather than the defense in their 
approach to a case. In addition, several studies (e.g., Boehm, 1968; Goldberg, 1970; 
Jurow, 1971; Moran & Comfort, 1986) have shown that death-qualified jurors are more 
authoritarian (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Stanford, 1950), as well as more 
punitive. Subsequently, this abundance of research suggests that defendants, despite the 
merits of the case, are at a considerable disadvantage in capital trials because of death-
qualified jurors. The current research expands this exploration by investigating the 
comprehensibility of the instructions given by a judge in a capital trial. 
 
Life Juries versus Death Juries 
It is believed that views of capital punishment are part of an array of crime and 
justice attitudes; thus, death-qualified jurors possess other distinctive perspectives that 
predispose them to view evidence more negatively to the defense. For example, 
compared to those who would be excluded from a capital jury due to their opposition to 
the death penalty, death-qualified jurors are more likely to trust prosecutors and distrust 
defense attorneys; consider inadmissible evidence even if instructed by the judge to 
ignore it; and infer guilt from a defendant's silence (Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, 1984). It has 
been shown that death-qualified jurors are more hostile to psychological defenses such as 
schizophrenia (Ellsworth, Bukaty, Cowan, & Thompson, 1984). These jurors tend to 
view prosecution witnesses as more believable, more credible, and more helpful (Cowan 
et al., 1984). According to Fitzgerald and Ellsworth, these types of jurors are less likely 
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to believe in the imperfect nature of the criminal justice process, as well as less likely to 
agree that even the worst criminal should be considered for mercy. 
 Geimer and Amsterdam (1988) interviewed three capital jurors from five cases in 
which the jury agreed upon a life sentence and five cases in which the jury agreed upon a 
sentence of death. Juries rendering death sentences were inclined to believe that there was 
a presumption that they were to return a death sentence unless convinced otherwise. The 
most frequently cited reason for a capital sentence in the study was the gruesome or cruel 
manner in which the murder was carried out. Also, the most often cited factor for 
returning a life sentence was lingering doubt about the defendant's guilt.   
 According to Bowers and Steiner (1999), some jurors mistakenly thought that a 
capital murder verdict meant the death penalty, either because they thought the law 
mandated it or because they recognized it as the only acceptable punishment. Further, 
some jurors thought that specific aggravating characteristics of the crime, specifically the 
killing of a police officer, by itself, warranted capital punishment. Conversely, in some 
instances all or most of the jurors had decided by the time of guilt deliberations, they 
would not vote for the death penalty, indicating that it was not appropriate for the specific 
kind of crime. Moreover, jurors who voiced opposition to the death penalty gave specific 
reasons relating to concerns about mitigation, doubts about aggravation, or misgivings 
about the proof of guilt. 
 
Guilt and Penalty Phases of Capital Trials 
 According to Costanzo and Costanzo (1992), very little is known about the 
relationship between guilt and penalty phases and how the two interact. In the guilt phase, 
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jurors are asked to resolve what happened and why. A verdict of guilty or not guilty is 
ascertained through an evaluation of the facts of the case. On the other hand, penalty 
deliberations begin after a guilty verdict has been specified. There, evidence about what 
happened is secondary. Instead, the jurors are required to determine the punishment that 
the particular defendant deserves (Costanzo & Costanzo). After a capital defendant is 
convicted and the trial enters the penalty phase, the State will argue to the jury that the 
defendant should receive a sentence of death due to the presence of at least one 
aggravating factor. The defense will argue and present evidence of one or more 
mitigating circumstances, asserting that this evidence should mitigate against a death 
sentence for a life sentence instead (Luginbuhl & Middendorf, 1988). 
In the Bowers, Sandys, and Steiner (1998) study, many jurors referred to their 
experiences during the guilt stage of the trial when explaining their reasons for taking a 
stand on punishment before the sentencing stage of the trial. They reported that early pro-
life jurors stated that the jury’s deliberations on guilt had shaped their position on the 
defendant’s punishment; whereas, pro-death jurors more frequently pointed to the 
presentation of evidence during the guilt phase. The early pro-death jurors were quick to 
decide that the defendant was guilty of capital murder and were pretty sure of themselves. 
Nearly nine out of ten (88.1%) early pro-death jurors stated that they thought the 
defendant was guilty before beginning deliberations. Conversely, fewer than half (44.9%) 
of the early pro-life jurors had decided before deliberations on guilt that the defendant 
was guilty of capital murder.  
Thus, it is evident that various factors affect guilt and penalty phases of capital 
trials. First, extending the work of Smith and Medin (1981), Hans (1988) surmised that 
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the penalty decisions of jurors involve a prototype-matching strategy. This strategy holds 
that jurors posses general prototypes of criminals who deserve to be executed for their 
crimes. The prototypes might well be influenced by celebrated cases (i.e. Charles Manson 
or Ted Bundy). The match between the defendant and the prototype subsequently 
commands the decision to recommend life or death.  
Second, the Bowers et al. (1998) study revealed three basic themes occurred 
during guilt deliberations concerning punishment: the temptations and pressures to talk 
about the defendant’s punishment during guilt deliberations; the dynamics of pro-death 
influences and advocacy in these discussions; and the character of pro-life influences and 
arguments. Many jurors reported that the issue of punishment arose during guilt 
deliberations but said they tried to resist temptation, but not all jurors were able to do so. 
Some jurors thought that a capital murder verdict meant the death penalty, either because 
they thought the law mandated it or because they thought it the right thing to do. The 
jurors’ discussions during guilt deliberations of the prosecution’s voir dire questioning, of 
the trial judge’s charging instructions, and of statutory “special circumstances” appeared 
to reinforce a mistaken impression that death was legally just. In some instances, all or 
most jurors had decided by the time of guilt deliberations that they would not vote for the 
death penalty, stating that it was not appropriate for the specific crime or for the specific 
defendant.  
Third, as mentioned in the Bowers et al. study (1998), research investigating the 
comprehensibility of death penalty instructions also provides evidence of very poor 
comprehension of legal instructions by jurors (e.g., Haney & Lynch, 1994, 1997; Haney, 
Sontag, & Costanzo, 1994; Luginbuhl, 1992; Lynch & Haney, 2000; Wiener, Prichard, & 
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Weston, 1995), which inevitably contributes to mistaken and inappropriate decisions in 
capital cases. In other words, the jury instructions which govern capital penalty-phase 
decision-making are no more comprehensible than others (Lynch & Haney). Perhaps the 
unique nature of this stage of a capital trial may even exacerbate the problem of 
comprehension. In short, the current study will demonstrate that capital penalty phase 
instructions, with its legalese (i.e. mitigators, aggravators, unanimity, and weighing), 
may, in fact, superimpose juror confusion rather than refine this uniquely subjective 
decision-making-process.  
 
Emerging Role of Pattern Instructions 
 In all jury trials in the United States, the closing phase of the trial consists of the 
judge’s delivery of instructions to the jury. The judge, as the authority on the rules of law 
in the case, must inform the jury, the final decision maker in matters concerning the facts 
in the case, on the law relevant to its decision. Moreover, in criminal trials, the jury’s 
instructions include a description of the elements that must be proved if the defendant is 
to be found guilty. For example, the jury in a murder case would be told the legal 
definitions of various types of homicide and the findings of fact that intimate each type of 
homicide. Further, the instructions include a general commentary on how the jury is to 
regard the evidence (i.e. what issues are and are not to be considered in deciding whether 
a witness is credible) and instructs on how convinced the jury must be in order to reach a 
verdict (i.e. beyond a reasonable doubt) (Lind, 1982). In addition, the instructions 
generally define what is and what is not evidence, point out the chief issues, present the 
applicable law, and describe the function of the jury (Forston, 1975). 
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 The specific instructions furnished to the jury are usually left to the discretion of 
the trial judges; however, they may consult with the attorneys in the case. Over the last 
several decades, though, there has been a movement to use “pattern” or standardized 
instructions, which are written by judicial or bar groups to cover the most common trial 
situations and issues (Elwork, Alfini, & Sales, 1982; Kerr & Bray, 1982). However, 
Nieland (1979) noted that the development of pattern instructions was brought about in 
part by a desire to simplify the process of selecting appropriate jury instructions for 
lawyers and judges and in part by a desire to reduce appellate court caseloads precipitated 
by claimed error in jury instructions. Nonetheless, as far back as 1930, commentators 
have criticized jury comprehension of instructions.  Jurist Jerome Frank stated that the 
words spoken to the jury by the judge might as well be a foreign language (Frank, 1930, 
p. 181).   
 In an attempt to reduce appeals originating in instruction error, pattern 
instructions have apparently had poor success (Severance & Loftus, 1982). Nieland 
(1978) analyzed 2,049 Illinois Supreme Court cases between 1956 and 1973 to assess the 
success of pattern instructions. Nieland found that the standardized instructions had no 
reliable effect in reducing the total number of appeals, the number of times instructional 
errors were raised on appeal, or the number of reversals and retrials granted in the Illinois 
Supreme Court. Data, however, from Arkansas and New York as well as Illinois suggest 
that standardized instructions may reduce the number of reversals based on specific 
allegations that the law was incorrectly stated (Nieland). Unfortunately, however, pattern 
instructions still have one principal weakness. Although the instructions have been 
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prepared to be legally accurate, little thought has been contributed to making them 
understandable to the average juror (Elwork, Sales, & Alfini, 1977). 
 
Rejection of Mandatory Sentencing 
 Before the Furman decision in 1972, juries typically received no guidance 
informing them how to reach a decision in capital cases. They received information about 
the defendant and the offense and then decided whether death was the appropriate 
sentence. Thus, in Furman, the Supreme Court concluded that the unguided practices of 
the states were yielding death penalty decisions that were arbitrary or unprincipled. In 
fact, Justice Stewart compared the death sentence to a bolt of lightning, finding that “the 
defendants selected for capital punishment were a capriciously selected random handful 
of those whose conduct was equally reprehensible, most of whom did not receive a 
sentence of death” (Furman v Georgia, 1972, p. 310). Therefore, North Carolina and 
Louisiana both passed mandatory death sentences on all of those defendants convicted of 
particular offenses or of particular offenses committed under specified conditions (i.e. 
murder for hire) in their attempt to fulfill the obligations of Furman. The Court held, 
however, that these mandatory statutes violated the Eighth Amendment. Instead, the 
Court concluded that a case-by-case determination was required to guarantee that death 
was the appropriate punishment for that specific case. The difficulty with the schemes 
developed by North Carolina and Louisiana was the effect of eliminating individualized 
consideration and, instead, substituting automatic death sentences for particular offenses, 
with no regard to the character or record of the individual defendant or the circumstances 
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of the particular offense. Consequently, they were rejected as unconstitutional (Roberts v 
Louisiana, 1976; Woodson v North Carolina, 1976). 
 
 
Implementation of Guided Discretion 
 Subsequent decisions followed that renounced mandatory sentencing and 
endorsed the notion of guided discretion (Gregg v Georgia, 1976; Jurek v Texas, 1976; 
Proffitt v Florida, 1976). These cases established sentencing schemes that would, through 
legal instructions, tell the jury what factors had to be found if a defendant was to be 
sentenced to death and would leave the jury with discretion to consider any relevant case 
or offender characteristics that might lead to the conclusion that capital punishment was 
not appropriate. Thus, the Court, in essence, held that states could constitutionally 
execute offenders if they instructed juries properly about the factors they were to consider 
and the way those factors were to be weighed, because such instructions would produce 
rational and consistent death penalty determinations. 
 
Conceptualization of Terminology 
The bifurcation of the capital trial into separate guilt and sentencing phases is the 
most conclusive and uniform change in the administration of capital punishment under 
the statutes approved in Gregg v Georgia (1976) and companion cases (Bowers et al., 
1998). In accordance with the law, jurors make the life or death decision at a separate 
penalty phase after guilt has been determined as detailed by the sentencing instructions. 
These instructions were created in order to guide jurors through the death penalty 
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decision-making process as well as the exercise of sentencing discretion by articulating 
those aggravating and mitigating considerations that are relevant to this decision. By 
doing so, the verdicts, surmised by the Court, would be regulated and made consistent, 
shielded from racial bias, and rendered constitutional. Unfortunately empirical evidence 
suggests that these instructional safeguards have failed to remedy the problems identified 
in Furman (e.g., Gross & Mauro, 1989). Many Supreme Court decisions have culminated 
over time the foundation to follow when making capital decisions and as is demonstrated 
below, various terms have been addressed by the Court in an attempt to refine the penalty 
phase proceedings. 
 
Aggravating Circumstances 
 In the penalty phase, jurors are first presented with evidence relating to 
aggravating features of the murder that might justify the death penalty (Hans, 1988). 
According to Haney and Lynch (1994, p. 420), "aggravating means to willfully or 
consciously commit a crime" or "the defendant intentionally tried to commit the crime 
with prior knowledge of the circumstances." Moreover, aggravation in relation to the 
statute means worsening but in laymens terms means annoying and neither aggravation 
nor mitigation is defined by the statute (Diamond, 1993). The common meaning of an 
"aggravating" circumstance, then, is entirely different from the legal definition, which 
refers to something concerning the crime which makes it more serious than an ordinary 
murder or something about the defendant that justifies putting him to death (Tiersma, 
1995).  
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 The "trigger" for any death sentence is the determination of at least one 
aggravating circumstance. Without it, a death sentence can not be imposed in Tennessee 
and most other states. Death penalty states vary in the number of aggravating 
circumstances listed in their statutes. Connecticut has the fewest with 7; Delaware has the 
most with 22 (Acker & Lanier, 1998). Enumerated in state statutes, these aggravating 
circumstances usually include the defendant's past history of violent criminal conduct, the 
existence of more than one killing, and the commission of a murder while in the process 
of committing another felony such as robbery or rape (Hans, 1988). 
 Although the aggravating requirement, like the mitigating requirement, was 
intended to reduce death-eligibility, it has not done so very well (Bohm, 1999). Steiker 
and Steiker (1998, p. 57) stated, "States have adopted, and the Court has sustained, 
aggravating circumstances that arguably encompass every murder." Accordingly, 
research demonstrates that "virtually all persons sentenced to death in Georgia before 
Furman would have been deemed death eligible under Georgia's post-Furman statute" 
(Steiker & Steiker, p. 58).  
 One of the first tests concerning aggravating circumstances was Godfrey v 
Georgia (1980). The Court held that the aggravating factor under which Godfrey had 
been sentenced to death was too broad and vague; and, subsequently, reversed the death 
sentence. His offense, according to the specifics of the statute, was "outrageously or 
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of the mind, or an 
aggravated battery to the person." The problems were that the trial judge did not explain 
the meaning of the aggravating circumstance to the jury, and the Georgia Supreme Court 
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did not apply a clarifying interpretation of the meaning it had developed in previous 
cases. 
 In Barclay v Florida (1983), the central issue was whether a non-statutory 
aggravating circumstance, specifically racial hatred in this case, was admissible. Barclay 
was a member of the Black Liberation Army, whose purpose was "to kill white persons 
and to start a revolution and a racial war." The Court upheld the death sentence, 
signifying that the sentencing authority may consider virtually any aggravating factor 
(that is properly brought before it) once it has determined at least one statutory 
aggravating circumstance exists. 
  
Mitigating Circumstances 
 One of the changes to death penalty statutes approved by the Court in Gregg was 
the requirement that sentencing authorities consider mitigating circumstances before 
determining the sentence. The issue of mitigation is of great importance to the fair 
administration of capital sentences because mitigation is literally the only thing at the 
final stage of a capital trial that stands between a capital defendant and the death sentence 
(Haney & Lynch, 1994). Nonetheless, in People v McLain (1988), a penalty phase jury 
sent the court a note asking for definitions of aggravation and mitigation. The court 
responded with a note: "Are you asking for the ordinary definition of those terms or 
whether there is a legal definition? If you are asking for the latter, there is no legal 
definition of these terms. They are to be given there [sic] commonly accepted and 
ordinary meaning" (People v McLain, 1988, p. 580). The jury then sent another note that 
said: "Being unfamiliar with the term of mitigation we would like the dictionary meaning 
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of both mitigation and aggravation, please" (p. 580). In short, this was an admission by 
the jury, themselves, that none of them understood the term "mitigation." 
 Responding to these requests, though, the court provided the following 
definitions: "Aggravation: An act or circumstance that makes more serious or more 
severe...Mitigation: An act or circumstance that makes less serious or less severe." The 
California Supreme Court held that the lower court had not erred in providing these 
definitions (People v McLain, 1989, p. 580-81). 
 The first challenge on this issue came in 1978 in the cases of Lockett v Ohio and 
Bell v Ohio. In those cases, the issue was whether defense attorneys could present only 
mitigating circumstances that were listed in the death penalty statute. The Court held that 
trial courts must allow any mitigating circumstances that a defense attorney presents, and 
not just those enumerated in the statute. Later the Court reinforced that juries may not 
refuse to consider any relevant mitigating evidence, even non-statutory mitigating 
circumstances (Hitchcock v Dugger, 1987). 
 In 1988, in Mills v Maryland, the Court considered jury instructions that required 
the jury to be unanimous in its finding of a mitigating circumstance. In other words, 
before a juror could "weigh" a mitigating circumstance against an aggravating 
circumstance, all 12 members of the jury had to agree that the mitigating circumstance 
did exist. The Court ruled that jury unanimity on the presence of a mitigating 
circumstance is not required before an individual juror can weigh it against aggravating 
factors. The issue was addressed again in McKoy v North Carolina (1990), and the Court 
held that sentencing instructions, which prevent the jury from considering any mitigating 
factor-even those not found to be unanimous-violated the Eighth Amendment. In other 
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words, the Court held that the sentencing instructions must clearly relate to the jurors that 
mitigating factors need not be found unanimously.  
 As recently as 1989, the Court ruled that the “absence of instructions informing 
the jury that it could consider and give effect to the mitigating evidence” offered by a 
defendant could result in a death sentence reversal (Penry v Lynaugh, 1989, p. 328). A 
year later, the Court stated that the requirement of individualized capital sentencing “is 
satisfied by allowing the jury to consider all relevant mitigating evidence” (Blystone v 
Pennsylvania, 1990, p. 308). 
 Even still, there seems to be a general agreement among litigators and death 
penalty scholars concerning the inadequate description of the concept of mitigation in the 
instructions themselves, which could lead jurors to overlook what might represent 
compelling reasons to render a life verdict (e.g., Geimer, 1990-91; Haney & Lynch, 1994; 
White, 1987), not to mention the ability of capital juries to apply the concept to penalty 
phase evidence (Haney & Lynch). If jurors do not understand the concept of mitigation or 
if the instructions are not clear on how to define mitigators or how to implement 
mitigating evidence into the decision-making process, then, allowing defendants to 
present such evidence and assuming that juries heed the evidence may be an unavailing 
undertaking. For example, Blankenship et al. (1997), found that only 58.2% of the sample 
understood what a mitigator was, while 72.9% said they knew what an aggravating 
circumstance was after reading the instructions. The present study specifically addressed 
the issue of mitigating evidence and jurors’ ability to discern the requirements for 
mitigation as well as the requirement for weighing mitigators against aggravators and the 
ability to comprehend non-enumerated mitigators. 
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 Unanimity Requirement 
 Jurors must be unanimous in their finding of any aggravating factor (State v 
Kirkley, 1983). However, this requirement does not apply to mitigating factors. As a 
result of McKoy (1990) and Mills (1988), any juror who believes that a mitigating factor 
exists is allowed to consider that factor in her/his final decision on life or death.  
 It is imperative that the sentencing instructions convey this message to the jurors, 
for there are crucial consequences if the difference is not correctly understood (Luginbuhl 
& Howe, 1995). If, for example, jurors think that in order to consider mitigating 
evidence, they must be unanimous, then, chances are likely that the evidence would not 
be considered. Thus, an inaccurate sentence of death could possibly be given. Such a 
decision would also be a direct violation of McKoy (1990) and Mills (1988). 
 
Process of Weighing Mitigators Against Aggravators 
 The court has said that each juror must “weigh” mitigating and aggravating 
circumstances on his or her own moral scales (People v Milner, 1988), that jurors are the 
judges of the weight to be given to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances they 
deem present in the case, and that it is error for a trial court to instruct jurors to decide the 
fate of the defendant by taking into account beliefs which are based on the community at 
large (i.e. People v Harrison, 1963). This principle is based on the theory that the process 
enacts the “conscience of the community.” However, Krauss (1989, p. 651) pointed out 
that “the balancing process is left to each juror’s individual discretion, and it is the 
presumption that juries are a microcosm of the community that leads the law to view jury 
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verdicts as expressions of community values.” In sum, the procedure by which jurors are 
supposed to weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors is often left unclear by the 
confusing language in the instructions that describe them (Eisenberg & Wells, 1993; 
Haney & Lynch, 1997; Luginbuhl & Burkhead, 1994; Wiener, Pritchard, & Weston, 
1995).  
 
History of Jurors' Comprehension of Sentencing Instructions 
 Debates concerning the impact of guided discretion statutes raised a related issue 
of whether jury decision-making can be sufficiently guided by judicial instructions (Hans, 
1988). Subsequently, countless studies have shown that jurors routinely do not 
understand the instructions they are presented or, at best, have limited understanding of 
them (e.g., Blankenship et al., 1997; Buchanan et al., 1978; Charrow & Charrow, 1979; 
Elwork et al., 1982; Elwork et al., 1977; Frank & Applegate, 1998; Garvey, Johnson, & 
Marcus, 2000; Haney & Lynch, 1994; Haney, Sontag, & Costanzo, 1994; Hastie et al., 
1983; Luginbuhl, 1992; Reifman, Gusick, & Ellsworth, 1992; Rose & Ogloff, 2001; 
Severance & Loftus, 1982; Steele & Thornburg, 1988; Strawn & Buchanan, 1976). 
Perhaps, this limited understanding was best described by Weltner (1979, p. 20): 
  The jury system, at its bedrock, proceeds upon the idea 
  that it is possible to inform 12 persons about the principles 
  of law to such extent that they are able to remember and 
  apply the law to the facts as they find them from the  
  evidence. Whoever first conceived that proposition was 
  basically out of touch with reality. It is fatuous to suppose 
  that every jury of 12 untutored people can listen to, remember 
  and accurately apply principles of law-however complex-as they 
  are expounded by the judge. 
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Furthermore, consider for a moment how well a group of lawyers and criminal justice 
professors would perform if given a thirty minute lecture on how to perform an 
appendectomy and then were immediately tested on their comprehension (Strawn & 
Buchanan). Assume further that during the lecture, a multitude of the words used were 
jargon to the medical profession and were not explained in the lecture (Strawn & 
Buchanan). In short, the research appears to describe juries who are ill-advised of their 
required duty but nonetheless are sitting in judgment of defendants’ ability to live or die. 
The following headings set forth the introduction of a plethora of research which serves 
to confirm at least some of the reasons that the various researchers referred to above have 
given for the absence of understanding of pattern jury instructions.  
 
Technical Language 
 Technically accurate statements of the law are a significant problem for criminal 
defendants because of the ambiguity and possibility of misinterpretation of the sentencing 
instructions by jurors (Severance et al., 1984, see, e.g., Charrow & Charrow, 1979; 
Elwork et al., 1977, 1982; Strawn & Buchanan, 1976). Misunderstanding arises from the 
syntax of the instructions, the manner of presentation, or the general unfamiliarity of lay 
people with legal terminology (Severance et al.). As a result, many researchers have 
investigated whether jurors understand the charging instructions and have reached the 
same conclusion: typical pattern jury instructions, drafted by lawyers to be legally 
precise, were incomprehensible to jurors (Reed, 1980). For example, Forston (1973) 
found that after hearing instructions, 80% of his subjects still did not understand basic 
rules of evidence and the burden of proof.    
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Misunderstanding is also evidenced in Geimer and Amsterdam's (1988) study in 
Florida that surveyed a minimum of three jurors from 10 different capital trials. It was 
determined that juries that enforce death sentences tend to maintain a "presumption of 
death," a belief that they should employ a sentence of death unless convinced otherwise. 
Moreover, some jurors reported that they thought a death verdict was actually mandatory.  
  Haney et al. (1994) remarked that half of the juries from the California juror 
panel studied had requested further clarification of the sentencing instructions from the 
trial judge after they had been read. Further, one California juror described the dilemma 
with which many capital juries find themselves: 
  The first thing we asked for after the instruction was, could the 
  judge define mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Because 
  the different verdicts that we could come up with depended on 
  if mitigating outweighed aggravating, or if aggravating outweighed 
  mitigating, or all of that. So we wanted to make sure. I said, 'I don't 
  know that I exactly understand what it means.' And then everybody 
  else said, 'No, neither do I,' or 'I can't give you a definition.' So 
  we decided we should ask the judge. Well, the judge wrote back 
and said, 'You have to glean it from the instructions' (Haney et al., 1994, p. 
169). 
 
Of the 30 California jurors interviewed, only 13 showed reasonably accurate 
comprehension of the concepts of aggravating and mitigating. Moreover, within the same 
study, only 2 of the 24 Oregon jurors interviewed were able to accurately recall all three 
of the sentencing questions posed to them in the judge's charge. 
 Luginbuhl and Howe (1995) found similar results from eighty-three jurors who 
had served in capital trials in North Carolina. Roughly one half (48%) of the jurors 
incorrectly believed that they could consider as an aggravating factor any factor that 
made the crime worse. Only about one third (36%) of the jurors correctly understood that 
they were to use only the aggravating factors mentioned in the specific list. Also, one half 
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(48%) of the jurors incorrectly believed that they could have considered non-enumerated 
aggravating circumstances, one fourth (26%) incorrectly believed that aggravating factors 
needed only to be proven by a preponderance of the evidence or to the satisfaction of the 
juror.  
 Comprehension was worse when considering mitigating factors. While more than 
one half (59%) of the jurors were aware that they could entertain any evidence they 
desired as a mitigating factor, under one half (47%) correctly understood that mitigating 
factors did not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Similarly, less than one half 
(47%) of the jurors were aware that unanimity was not required to find the existence of 
mitigating factors, while a similar percentage (42%) incorrectly believed that unanimity 
was required (e.g., Luginbuhl, 1992). 
 Research suggests that there is a wide-spread problem in jurors’ being able to 
determine the difference between, or even the definitions of, aggravators and mitigators, 
specifically with mitigators (e.g., Costanzo & Costanzo, 1992; Haney & Lynch, 1994, 
1997). Haney and Lynch (1997) discovered that while 71% of the subjects studied were 
able to provide at least a partially correct definition of the term "aggravating," only 52% 
could do so for "mitigating." Furthermore, only 41% of the subjects involved could 
provide at least a relatively correct definition for both aggravation and mitigation. 
 
Schemas 
 Some researchers have suggested that the concept of schemata greatly affects a 
jurors' ability to render a just verdict. A schema, as referred to in this case, is a person's 
expectation about how an event should proceed. Such a schema can be based on many 
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factors, such as past experience, shared cultural knowledge, and the media (Luginbuhl, 
1992). Several studies (Cohen, 1981; Darley & Gross, 1983; Higgins & McCann, 1984) 
have argued that a person will recall and interpret events in a manner that parallels his or 
her schema unless deflections from the schema are pronounced (Luginbuhl). In other 
words, preexisting schemas can influence how jurors perceive, store into memory, and 
recall information, as well as help shape their access to and reliance on such information 
throughout the decision-making process (Diamond, 1993; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Haney, 
1997). Thus, it is evident the importance of clear and concise sentencing instructions to 
combat individuals' personal beliefs and standards.  
 
Timing of Sentencing Instructions 
 Yet another point of poor juror comprehension of the law has been determined to 
be the timing of the instructions (Elwork et al., 1977; Heuer & Penrod, 1989; Kassin & 
Wrightsman, 1979; Reifman et al., 1992; Schwarzer, 1981; Strawn & Munsterman, 
1982). The assumption behind this timing has been that by instructing the jury just before 
deliberations, the instructions can be easily recalled (Heuer & Penrod). Attorneys 
sometimes make references to the laws discussed in the instructions periodically through 
the trial, but it is not until the conclusion of the trial that the judge instructs the jurors to 
the technicalities of the laws involved in the case. Further, it is not until the conclusion of 
the penalty phase that jurors hear the instructions in their entirety (Luginbuhl & Howe, 
1995). Usually, the jurors have listened to days, perhaps weeks, of testimony, including 
arguments by counsel, without knowing what their requirements are and how they are 
supposed to go about making such serious decisions. Obviously, if jurors make their 
 46
decision as the evidence is being disseminated, as research suggests, a charge at the end 
of the trial is a bit too late to have an effect on the verdict. 
 However, it has been noted that some researchers have found that giving 
preliminary instructions either have no effect or decrease comprehension (Cruse & 
Browne, 1987; Elwork et al., 1977; Greene & Loftus, 1985). Cruse and Browne (1987) 
gave subjects a full set of instructions and found that it made no difference on verdicts 
whether they were given before or after the evidence. Elwork et al. found that instructions 
given at the end of the trial actually improved comprehension as compared to being given 
in the beginning, but the effect on verdicts was not measured.  
Nevertheless, one point upon which most researchers agree is that repeating the 
instructions two or more times aids in comprehension and improves accuracy of the 
verdicts (Cruse & Browne, 1987; Elwork et al., 1977; Forston, 1975; Heuer & Penrod, 
1989; Strawn & Munsterman, 1982). Forston suggested that ideally instructions should 
be given not only at the beginning, but also periodically throughout the trial as 
appropriate. Cruse and Browne also determined that giving a full set of standard 
instructions twice significantly increased verdict accuracy. Heuer and Penrods' study 
found that preliminary instructions did assist the jurors with following legal guidelines in 
their decision making. Kassin and Wrightsman (1979) stated that subjects who received 
the instructions before the evidence produced a low rate of conviction because they 
actually viewed the defendant as less likely to have committed the crime.  
 
Summary 
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 As can be seen by the results of the above studies, juror-sentencing instructions 
and the interpretations of them definitely maintain some severe flaws. In fact, it can be 
said that many individuals are currently sitting on death row or have already been 
executed that were convicted by persons not truly understanding the breadth of their 
deed. Furthermore, the current study is simply a part of a growing plethora of empirical 
research that has determined across the country that the common layperson just does not 
understand even the most common principles required in rendering a just and equitable 
verdict in a capital case. Meanwhile, despite the misunderstanding of the law, juries from 
all over continue to make the decision to send individuals to death row. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 The purpose of this research was to expand on the work of Blankenship et al. 
(1997) by assessing the ability of jurors' comprehension of revised death penalty 
sentencing instructions. Prior research in this area suggests that many juries convict 
individuals of capital murder and sentence them to death despite extensive levels of 
misunderstanding of the guiding instructions provided them by the court. Other studies 
have shown that through re-wording of instructions comprehension level increases 
significantly. This thesis will explore whether a revised set of death penalty instructions 
actually improves juror understanding at a level beyond chance.  
 
Procedures for Collecting Data 
Subjects 
 Subjects were individuals from Shelby County, Tennessee who had been 
summoned for jury duty in that county. Approximately every two weeks, a new jury pool 
is randomly selected from the population of prospective jurors in Shelby County 
(Blankenship et al., 1997). The questionnaire was administered to volunteers producing 
201 usable questionnaires. The sample consisted of 124 (62%) females and 73 (36%) 
males, including 4 (2%) missing cases, and 62 (31%) Blacks, 130 (65%) Whites, and 1 
(.5%) Hispanic, with 8 (4%) missing cases.  
Prospective jurors were surveyed in a waiting room where individuals sit and wait 
to be summoned. Volunteers were given a packet of material that contained the 
questionnaire, along with verbal instructions as to the purpose of the survey. Respondents 
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were asked to read a brief introduction and then to respond to some preliminary 
questions. The sentencing instructions were read aloud as well as provided in the 
questionnaire so that they could follow along. The prospective jurors then answered a 
series of questions that assessed their understanding of the sentencing instructions. 
Respondents were able to refer to their copy of the written instructions at any time during 
completion of the questionnaire.  
 Aside from the fact that the instructions were read aloud during the second phase 
of the study (an audio tape was played during the initial study), no other facet of the study 
changed between the two phases of the survey except that the original sentencing 
instructions were revised (see Appendix B) in order to determine if juror comprehension 
could be improved. After reading the revised sentencing instructions, respondents replied 
to the same questions posed to respondents in the initial study. 
 
Apparatus 
Data for this study were collected in 1993 from a questionnaire conducted in 
Shelby County, Tennessee. The questionnaire contained a copy of the written revised 
instructions, which addressed a number of issues different from the original study. The 
revised sentencing instructions were approved for accuracy by Bill Reddick a capital case 
attorney. The changes consisted primarily of: (1) restating the requirement that the jury 
must be unanimous in finding the existence of an aggravating circumstance or 
circumstances, that the state bears the burden of proving aggravating circumstances 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the jury is limited to statutorily enumerated 
aggravating circumstances (page 5 of questionnaire); (2) restating the requirement that if 
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any juror or jurors believed that the State had failed to meet its obligation with regard to 
proving the existence of aggravating circumstances, then the jury could not consider that 
aggravating circumstance, and if no aggravating circumstance is proven to exist, the jury 
is required to return a sentence of life imprisonment (middle of page 6 of questionnaire); 
(3) the phrase mitigating circumstance was defined and examples were provided (top of 
page 7 of questionnaire); (4) the requisite that jury unanimity is not required for finding 
the existence of mitigating circumstances was emphasized (middle of page 7 of the 
questionnaire); (5) the requirement that any juror or jurors can consider non-enumerated 
mitigating circumstances was emphasized (middle of page 7 of the questionnaire); and 
(6) some guidance was given to assist jurors in the process of weighing mitigating against 
aggravating circumstances (bottom of page 7 of the questionnaire). 
 
Variables 
Level of Understanding Measures 
 Most prior research focuses on other various aspects of sentencing instructions 
when considering level of understanding. These include intent, burden of proof, 
presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, using prior conviction, and/or definition of 
crime (e.g., Buchanan et al., 1978; Severance et al., 1984; Severance & Loftus, 1982, 
1984). Others, however, look at random issues such as testing juror understanding of their 
duties and responsibilities as jurors as well as points of law relating to the case (e.g., 
Elwork at al., 1982). More recently, though, researchers have began looking at the 
importance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in relation to the understanding 
of sentencing instructions (e.g., Diamond & Levi, 1996; Haney & Lynch, 1994; 
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Luginbuhl, 1992; Luginbuhl & Howe, 1995; Luginbuhl & Middendorf, 1988). However, 
research examining in-depth effectiveness of sentencing instructions in explaining 
aggravators and mitigators is very limited. Thus, this research attempted to assess jurors' 
comprehension of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as well as the concept of 
unanimity and weighing.  
 
 Jury Unanimity on Existence of Mitigating Circumstances. Prospective jurors 
were presented with four scenarios (see Appendix C) that assessed jurors' level of 
understanding on whether or not the jury panel must be unanimous when determining the 
existence of mitigating circumstances. After each scenario, participants were asked "Did 
the juror (or jury) follow the law?" The response categories were "yes," (scored as 1) 
"no," (scored as 2) or "don't know" (scored as 3). The correct response for each scenario 
is reported in Appendix C. The scenarios are as follows: (1) The defendant was only 25 
years of age when he committed the murder. A juror decides that the defendant's age is a 
mitigating circumstance. However, the other 11 jurors disagree and insist that his age is 
not a mitigating circumstance. This one juror believes that she cannot consider a 
mitigating circumstance unless the entire jury unanimously agrees that it exists. She 
therefore votes for the death penalty. (2) One juror decides from the evidence that the 
defendant cooperated with the police. The same juror decides that the defendant's 
cooperation is a mitigating circumstance. The other 11 jurors argue that such cooperation 
cannot be considered because they do not all agree that it is a mitigating circumstance. 
The one juror decides to consider the defendant's cooperation with the police as a 
mitigating circumstance, despite the disagreement with the other 11 jurors. (3) Eleven 
 52
jurors decide from the evidence that the defendant was abused as a child. The same 11 
jurors decide that this history of child abuse is a mitigating circumstance. One juror 
disagrees that such abuse is a mitigating circumstance. Because the jurors cannot 
unanimously agree that being abused as a child is a mitigating circumstance, they do not 
consider it any further. (4) One juror decides from the evidence that the defendant was 
good to his family. This one juror decides that this is a mitigating circumstance. The 11 
other jurors disagree. They insist that no juror should consider the defendant's good 
relations with his family as a mitigating circumstance unless all 12 jurors agree that it is a 
mitigating circumstance. As a result, the one juror does not consider the defendant's being 
good to his family as a mitigating circumstance. 
 
 Jury Unanimity on Mitigating Circumstances Outweighing Aggravating 
Circumstances. This concept was assessed based upon the following five scenarios (5-9) 
(see Appendix C), with possible responses of "yes" (scored as 1), "no" (scored as 2), and 
"don't know" (scored as 3): (5) A juror decides that the fact that the defendant did not 
directly kill the victim is a mitigating circumstance that outweighs the aggravating 
circumstances. He is the only juror to believe this, and he votes against imposing the 
death penalty. (6) Every juror agrees that the defendant was mentally disturbed at the 
time of the crime. The jurors also agree that this is a mitigating circumstance. However, 
not all jurors agree that this mitigating circumstance outweighs the aggravating 
circumstances they have found. The jury, therefore, votes unanimously to impose the 
death penalty. (7) A juror believes that the mitigating circumstance of the defendant 
being mentally retarded outweighs the aggravating circumstances. He is the only juror to 
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feel this way, and because of his feelings he votes to impose a life sentence. (8) A juror 
decides from the evidence that the defendant had no significant history of prior criminal 
activity. The same juror concludes that this lack of prior criminal activity is a mitigating 
circumstance that outweighs the aggravating circumstances, and the juror votes not to 
impose the death penalty. (9) Eleven jurors believe that the defendant's mental 
disturbance at the time the crime was committed is not a mitigating circumstance. One 
juror believes that the defendant's mental disturbance is a mitigating circumstance. That 
same juror decides that the mental state of the defendant outweighs the aggravating 
circumstances found by the jury, even though none of the other jurors do. The juror votes 
for life, even though the other jurors tell him that is improper. 
 
 Comprehension of Non-Enumerated Mitigating Circumstances. The level of 
understanding of non-enumerated mitigating circumstances was measured using the 
following two scenarios (10-11) (see Appendix C) with possible responses of "yes" 
(scored as 1), "no" (scored as 2), and "don't know" (scored as 3): (10) The jury hears 
evidence that the defendant was well-behaved as a boy. They also believe that this is 
mitigating evidence. However, one juror notes that being a good child is not one of the 
mitigating circumstances that the judge specifically mentioned. For this reason, she 
concludes that she cannot consider this as a mitigating circumstance. (11) The jury 
decides from the evidence that the defendant felt great remorse for committing the 
murder. They also decide that remorse is a mitigating circumstance, even though remorse 
was not one of the mitigating circumstances specifically mentioned by the judge. In 
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deciding whether to impose a life sentence or the death penalty, they consider the 
defendant's remorse as a mitigating circumstance anyway. 
 
 The Standard for Proving the Existence of Mitigating Circumstances. The current 
study also viewed jurors' level of comprehension when determining the standard for 
proving the presence of mitigating factors. This concept was assessed using the following 
two scenarios (12-13) (see Appendix C), with possible response categories of "yes" 
(scored as 1), "no" (scored as 2), and "don't know" (scored as 3): (12) The jury hears 
evidence that the defendant cooperated with the police. The jury agrees that this is 
mitigating evidence, but they do not believe it has been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The jury therefore does not consider the defendant's cooperation as a mitigating 
circumstance. (13) The jury hears evidence that the murder was especially heinous, 
atrocious or cruel. Being especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel is an aggravating 
circumstance under the statute. However, the jury does not believe that the cruelty of the 
crime has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury, therefore, does not consider 
the cruelty of the crime as an aggravating circumstance. 
 
 Mitigating Circumstances Outweigh Aggravating Circumstances. How one 
determines the methodology for outweighing aggravators with mitigators is significant in 
determining whether or not jurors are appropriately convicting defendants of capital 
murder. Thus, this concept was analyzed using the following four scenarios (14-17) (see 
Appendix C), with possible responses of "yes" (scored as 1), "no" (scored as 2), and 
"don't know" (scored as 3): (14) The jury finds the existence of three aggravating 
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circumstances and only two mitigating circumstances. Because the jury counted more 
aggravating circumstances than mitigating circumstances, the jury votes to impose the 
death penalty. (15) The jury finds that one aggravating circumstance exists and that no 
mitigating circumstances exist. They, therefore, decide they must vote to impose a 
sentence of death. (16) The jury unanimously agrees that the murder was especially 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel. They also agree that this is an aggravating circumstance, and 
that it is not outweighed by the mitigating circumstances that exist as they interpret the 
instructions, this means they must vote to impose the death penalty, and they do so. (17) 
A juror considers all the evidence and comes to the conclusion that the mitigating 
circumstances, taken together, outweigh the aggravating circumstances and that death is 
not the appropriate punishment. However, he cannot find any individual mitigating 
circumstance that outweighs the aggravating circumstances. Therefore, the juror votes to 
impose the death penalty. 
 
Demographic/Background Characteristics 
 Gender. Participants were instructed to report their sex based on the options of 
"male" (scored as 1) and "female" (scored as 2). 
 
 Race. The racial or ethnic background of each participant was determined along 
the following scale: "Black" (scored as 1), "White" (scored as 2), "Hispanic" (scored as 
3), "Asian" (scored as 4), and "other" (scored as 5). 
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 Age. Respondents were asked in what year they were born. Their age was 
calculated by subtracting the year they were born from the year the data were collected -
1993. 
 
 Education. This item was determined by asking each subject the highest grade 
he/she had completed. Responses were “< than high school” (scored as 1), "high 
school/GED" (scored as 2), "associate/junior/community college" (scored as 3), 
"bachelor's" (scored as 4), and "graduate" (scored as 5). 
 
 Income. This variable was measured by asking the subjects to which group their 
total family income from all sources fell for the previous year before taxes. The options 
were as follows: "under $5,000" (scored as 1); "$5,000-$9,999" (scored as 2); "$10,000-
$19,999" (scored as 3); "$20,000-$29,999" (scored as 4); "$30,000-$39,999" (scored as 
5); "$40,000-$49,999" (scored as 6); "$50,000-$59,999" (scored as 7); "$60,000-
$69,999" (scored as 8); "$70,000 and over" (scored as 9). 
 
 Religious Orientation. This item assessed participants' religious affiliation by 
asking them their religious preference. The options were as follows: "Protestant" (scored 
as 1); "Catholic" (scored as 2); "Jewish" (scored as 3); "Other, please write in" (scored as 
4); and "None" (scored as 5). If respondent checked "protestant," he/she was instructed to 
answer the next question that asked for the specific protestant denomination he/she most 
closely associated with. The options were as follows: "Baptist" (scored as 1); "Southern 
Baptist" (scored as 2); "Church of Christ" (scored as 3); "Methodist" (scored as 4); 
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"Lutheran (other than Missouri Synod)" (scored as 5); "Episcopal" (scored as 6); 
"Presbyterian" (scored as 7); and "Other, please write in" (scored as 8). 
 
 Political Ideology. Responses for this item were generated by asking the subject 
to check which best described their political views. The options were as follows: "very 
liberal" (scored as 1); "liberal" (scored as 2); "middle-of-the-road" (scored as 3); 
"conservative" (scored as 4); "very conservative" (scored as 5). 
 
Procedures for Treating Data 
 Because the current research was more of a policy implications' study, the 
statistical analysis was purposefully kept simple in order for the common lay person to 
have an in-depth understanding of what occurred in the study. The first phase of data 
analysis involved the examination of frequency distributions for the respondents' 
demographic characteristics. A distribution of characteristics was reported for the entire 
sample. This allows the researcher to obtain a clear picture of the sample by reporting the 
characteristics of each respondent.  
 In the second phase of the study, proportions were used comparing the two 
samples, original instructions' responses from sample one to revised instructions' 
responses from the current study, sample two. The possible responses for each scenario 
(1-17) were: "yes," "no," and "don't know." Thus, for each scenario (1-17), the correct 
response was evaluated based upon the proportion that answered the question correctly. 
Then, a z score was obtained for the difference of proportions for the correct answer for 
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each scenario to determine whether the difference was based upon mere chance or 
whether the difference was statistically significant.  
 The z score was the most feasible statistical test to use in an analysis of this type 
for a number of reasons. The z-test requires that the sample come from a normal 
distribution; the standard deviation of the population must be known; independence of 
sampling is required; and the measurement scale of data must be at least interval. Also, a 
large sample size is required for this type of statistical analysis.  
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter examined how research was conducted by describing the 
questionnaire and the procedure used for collecting and evaluating the data. Next, the 
variable measures (e.g., level of understanding measures and demographic 
characteristics) were discussed; whereby each variable was assessed and explained. Then, 
the types of analyses conducted were described. The results of the analysis are presented 
in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
ANALYSIS OF DATA 
 
 The purpose of the research was to assess the juror comprehension of capital 
sentencing instructions after significant revisions were made from original sentencing 
instructions. This task was accomplished in the current research by revising the 
sentencing instructions focusing on the following areas: carefully restating certain 
statements of importance, defining particular jargon to improve clarification, and giving 
additional guidance as to the process jurors must follow when deliberating. Then, jurors 
were asked to answer a set of scenarios that measured different areas of comprehension. 
As previously noted, data were analyzed by first examining the percentages of correct 
responses to each scenario and then comparing them to the first sample in the study. 
Blankenship et al., (1997) found in the first sample that significant numbers of jurors do 
not understand the original instructions, written by the State of Tennessee. A z-score was 
then obtained for the correct response for each scenario to determine if the improvement, 
or lack thereof, from the first sample in the study that used the original instructions to the 
second sample that used revised instructions was statistically significant or, rather, simply 
a chance improvement. The results of the statistical tests are discussed in the following 
pages. 
 
Characteristics of the Respondents 
 Information on a variety of characteristics of each respondent was collected for 
the sample of the first part of the study, which included 495 respondents (see Table 1), 
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and the second sample, which included 201 respondents (see Table 1). A clear majority 
of the respondents (315 or 64%) were female and 36% (176) were male in sample one. 
Likewise, the current sample consisted of more females (124 or 63%) than males (73 or 
37%). More than half (291 or 60%) of the first sample were White with 187 (39%) 
Blacks. Similarly, the clear majority of the current sample was White (130 or 67%) 
whereas 32% (62) were Black. The mean age of the respondents in the first study was 41, 
with ages ranging from 20 to 66. Additionally, the mean age of the respondents of the 
current study was 41, with ages ranging from 20 to 67.  
A majority of the first sample (169 or 36%) had a high school diploma or G.E.D., 
25% (116) had an associates degree, 23% (107) had a bachelor's degree, 11% (53) had a 
graduate degree, and 5% (21) had less than a high school education. Twenty-nine percent 
(56) of the current sample had an associates degree, 28% (53) had a high school diploma 
or G.E.D., 26% (50) had a bachelor's degree, 17% (33) had a graduate degree, and less 
than one percent (1) had less than a high school education.  
Fourteen percent of the first sample (61) of respondents reported a total family 
income of $20,000-$29,000, and 14% (60) had a total family income of $30,000-$39,000. 
Thirty-two percent (55) of the respondents in the current study reported a total family 
income of $70,000-$79,000.  
Seventy-nine percent (358) of the respondents in the first study reported 
Protestant as their religious preference. Catholic denomination was second (38 or 8%). Of 
the 358 Protestants, 43% (152) reported their denomination as Baptist, and 15% (55) 
Methodists followed as a distant second. A clear majority of the current sample (141 or 
78%) reported a religious preference as being Protestant, with Catholics following a close 
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second (22 or 12%). Of the Protestants, a majority reported Baptist (61 or 44%). A 
majority of the first sample (155 or 35%) reported a conservative political ideology and 
31% (137) reported a middle-of-the-road political ideology. Thirty-nine percent (69) of 
the current sample reported a political ideology of conservative and 38% (68) reported 
middle-of-the-road, with only 9% (16) liberal and 2% (3) very liberal. In the first sample 
of the study, only two (.4%) respondents reported having previously served on a death 
penalty jury. Currently, only one (.5%) juror reported they have previously served on a 
death penalty jury. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 62
Table 1 
 
Characteristics of the Sample 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
           First Sample (n=495)          Second Sample (n=201) 
 
Variable  Frequency Percentage         Frequency        Percentage 
 
Gender   
     Male     176      35.6   73     37.1 
     Female     315      63.6            124       62.9 
 
Race   
     White     291      60.1            130     67.4  
     Black     187      38.6              62     32.1 
     Asian         3          .6     0     00.0 
     Hispanic         2          .4     1         .5 
 
Age   
     20 to 30      64      13.0   25     12.6 
     31 to 40    172      35.4   75     38.2 
     41 to 50    164      33.8   56     28.6 
     51 to 60      67      13.7   29     14.7 
     61 to 66      19        3.8   11       5.5 
    (Mean=41)    (Mean=41) 
  
Education      
     < Than H.S.     21        4.5     1         .5 
     H.S. or G.E.D.   169      36.3   53     27.5 
     Associates      116      24.9   56     29.0 
     Bachelors    107      23.0   50     25.9 
     Graduate                 53      11.4   33     17.1   
 
Total Family Income   
     Under $5000    18       4.1     1         .6 
     $5000-$9999     19       4.3     6       3.4 
     $10000-$19999     40       9.1              11       6.3 
     $20000-$29999     61     13.9   23     13.2 
     $30000-$39999     60     13.6   21     12.1 
     $40000-$49999     56     12.7   23     13.2 
     $50000-$59000     56     12.7   12       6.9 
     $60000-$69000     46     10.5   22     12.6 
     $70000-$79000     84     19.1   55     31.6 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Table Continues 
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Table 1 continued 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
        First Sample (n=495)             Second Sample (n=201) 
 
Variable  Frequency Percentage         Frequency        Percentage 
 
Religious Preference   
     Protestant    358                 78.9          141  77.9 
     Catholic      38        8.4            22  12.2 
     Jewish        7        1.5   2    1.1 
     Other      32        7.0   8    4.4 
     None      19        4.2   8    4.4 
 
Protestant Denomination   
     Baptist    152      42.6            61  44.2 
     Southern Baptist     54      15.1            17  12.3 
     Church of Christ     28        7.8   9    6.5 
     Methodist      55      15.4            18  13.0 
     Lutheran        7        2.0   2    1.4 
     Episcopal      17        4.8   5    3.6 
     Presbyterian     18        5.0            11    8.0 
     Other      26        7.3            15  10.9 
 
Political Ideology   
     Very Liberal     24        5.4   3    1.7 
     Liberal      82                 18.3            16    9.0 
     Middle-of-        
       the-road     137                    30.6            68  38.2 
     Conservative   155      34.6            69  38.8 
     Very Conservative   50      11.2            22  12.4 
 
Juror in Death Penalty Case  
     Yes         2         .4   1      .5 
      No     483     99.6          198  99.5 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 64
Measuring Juror Comprehension 
 
Jury Unanimity on Existence of Mitigating Circumstances 
 Tennessee sentencing instructions state that the jury must be unanimous in finding 
an aggravating circumstance but the instructions do not mention a similar requirement for 
mitigating circumstances (Blankenship et al., 1997). Scenarios 1 through 4 measure 
comprehension of this concept in many ways. In Scenarios 1 and 4, a juror believes that 
she cannot consider evidence as a mitigating circumstance unless the other members 
agree unanimously; this assumption is incorrect. Scenario 3 reverses the situation where 
11 jurors agree on the existence of a mitigating circumstance but the twelfth juror 
disagrees. The law is misapplied when the jury fails to consider the evidence. In Scenario 
2, a juror remains adamant in his decision to consider the evidence as a mitigating 
circumstance in spite of the disagreement with the other 11 jurors; this single juror's 
response is correct.  
 Table 2 indicates that a significant proportion of the sample in the first part of the 
study had trouble understanding the concept of jury unanimity when considering 
mitigating circumstances. The results show that 37.4% of the sample either answered 
incorrectly or indicated that they did not know on the correct response to Scenario 1, the 
scenario in this group in which they did the best. On the question in which the 
respondents did the worst, Scenario 4, 60.1% of the sample answered incorrectly or did 
not know.  
 For the second sample in the study, Table 2 indicates a significant improvement 
on all scenarios of juror understanding concerning jury unanimity of mitigating 
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circumstances. Respondents scored highest on Scenario 1; whereby, 78.3% of the sample 
answered the question correctly. The results also reveal a significant increase in 
comprehension in Scenario 4 in that 59.9% of the sample answered the question 
correctly, as compared to only 39.9% in the first part of the study. Scenarios 2 and 3 were 
found to be significant in the improvement of comprehension as well.  
 
Table 2 
 
 Jury Unanimity on Existence of Mitigating Circumstances (Percentages) 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
       Original    Revised   Original   Revised    Original   Revised 
                  ___________________________________________________ 
Scenario      Yes          Yes            No            No            DK           DK            Z Score 
                                                                                                                        Correct Response 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
     1               27.8         14.6           62.7 a         78.3 a           9.6            7.1         -3.95** 
    
     2               42.6 a       69.3 a         42.6           18.7        14.8          12.0        -6.37** 
 
     3               33.5         20.1           51.1 a         70.6 a      15.3            9.3        -4.63** 
 
     4               46.8         33.0           39.9 a         59.9 a      13.3          10.1        -3.98** 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
a Denotes correct response. 
**significant at ∝ = .05, one-tailed test. 
 
Jury Unanimity on Mitigating Circumstances Outweighing Aggravating Circumstances 
 
 Tennessee sentencing instructions do not give jurors direction about unanimity 
regarding the existence of mitigating circumstances; however, they state that the jury 
must be unanimous in determining that a mitigating circumstance outweighs the 
aggravating circumstance (Blankenship et al., 1997). Scenarios 5, 7, 8, and 9 measure this 
issue by presenting a juror who believes the evidence supports the existence of a 
mitigating circumstance that outweighs the aggravating circumstance. A significant 
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majority of the respondents from both waves of the study consistently answered this set 
of questions correctly.  
 Table 3 indicates that comprehension was quite good in determining unanimity of 
mitigators outweighing aggravators for sample one of the study. Seventy-one percent of 
the participants answered Scenarios 5 and 7 correctly. Scenario 8 was answered correctly 
by 70.5% of the respondents. Scenario 6, the worst question of the group, was still 
answered correctly by nearly half (47.6%) of the sample.  
 Sample two of the study was comparable to sample one in that comprehension 
was quite good on this set of questions. Table 3 indicates that comprehension still 
improved somewhat from sample one, however. Scenarios 7, 8, and 9 were all significant 
in improvement of comprehension regarding unanimity of the weighing process, with 
79.5%, 77.9%, and 71.4% answering correctly respectively. The results indicate that 
when the instructions thoroughly explain an issue, the comprehension rate is higher than 
when the instructions are less clear or contain omissions, as in the case of jury unanimity  
on the existence of mitigating circumstances (Blankenship et al., 1997). 
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Table 3 
 
 Jury Unanimity on Mitigating Circumstances Outweighing Aggravating Circumstances 
(Percentages) 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
       Original    Revised   Original   Revised    Original   Revised 
                  ___________________________________________________ 
Scenario      Yes          Yes            No            No            DK           DK            Z Score 
                                                                                                                        Correct Response 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
     5               70.9 a       72.2 a         19.3           18.2             9.8            9.6        -.342 
    
     6               42.9         44.6           47.6 a         48.2 a        9.4            7.2        -.142 
 
     7               70.9 a       79.5 a         21.9           14.9          7.2            5.6        -2.29** 
 
     8               70.5 a       77.9 a         21.5           16.8          8.0            5.3        -1.95** 
 
     9               63.5 a       71.4 a         22.5           20.6        12.0            8.0        -1.92** 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
a Denotes correct response. 
**significant at ∝ = .05, one-tailed test. 
 
Comprehension of Nonenumerated Mitigating Circumstances 
 Lockett v Ohio (1978) states that any evidence can be considered mitigating; thus, 
Tennessee's sentencing instructions assert that jurors are not limited to enumerated 
mitigating circumstances (Blankenship et al., 1997). Scenarios 10 and 11 measure 
participants' ability to understand examples of nonenumerated mitigating circumstances. 
When jurors are given little or no guidance, as discussed earlier, they tend to have 
difficulty in applying the law, and the results in Table 4 support this conclusion. In the 
first sample of the study, only 26.3% answered Scenario 10 correctly, and only 37.8% 
answered Scenario 11 correctly.  
 However, for the second sample used in the study, a more detailed explanation on 
mitigators was included, giving participants additional information on the term. 
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Therefore, the second sample resulted in dramatically different results. Table 4 indicates 
that 45.9% answered Scenario 10 correctly and 53.5% answered Scenario 11 correctly, a 
significant improvement from the first part of the study. 
 
Table 4 
 
 Comprehension of Nonenumerated Mitigating Circumstances (Percentages) 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
       Original    Revised   Original   Revised    Original   Revised 
                  ___________________________________________________ 
Scenario      Yes          Yes            No            No            DK           DK            Z Score 
                                                                                                                        Correct Response 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
     10             66.1         43.9          26.3 a       45.9 a           7.6           10.2        -5.03** 
     
     11             37.8 a       53.5 a        51.6         37.4           10.6             9.1        -3.65**      
_______________________________________________________________________ 
a Denotes correct response. 
**significant at ∝ = .05, one-tailed test. 
 
The Standard for Proving the Existence of Mitigating Circumstances 
 For the jury to find the existence of any aggravating circumstance, that 
circumstance must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and must be done so to every 
single juror. Thus the state in proving aggravating circumstances is held to the highest 
legal standard-proof beyond a reasonable doubt and unanimity of the jury. Proving the 
existence of mitigators is not held to the same standard. A mitigating circumstance must 
be proven only to the juror's satisfaction (Blankenship et al., 1997; Luginbuhl, 1992). 
However, the sentencing instructions provide no direction as to the level of proof 
required for proving the existence of a mitigating circumstance (Blankenship et al.). 
 Table 5 indicates that in the first sample in the study, 78.5% of the respondents 
either answered Scenario 12 incorrectly or did not know how to determine the level of 
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proof required for proving the existence of a mitigating circumstance. Additionally, 
35.3% answered Scenario 13 incorrectly or did not know.  
 Table 5 also indicates that comprehension of Scenario 12 remained a problem: 
only 39.5% of the sample answered correctly. However, it was still a significant 
improvement from sample one. On the other hand, Scenario 13 was answered correctly 
by 73.3% of the sample, a significant increase from sample one. Again, this is an 
indicator that when jurors receive adequate instructions, comprehension improves. 
Likewise, the evidence also supports the conclusion that insufficient instructions limit 
jurors' ability to correctly interpret the law. 
 
Table 5 
 
The Standard for Proving the Existence of Mitigating Circumstances (Percentages) 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
       Original    Revised   Original   Revised    Original   Revised 
                  ___________________________________________________ 
Scenario      Yes          Yes            No            No            DK           DK            Z Score 
                                                                                                                        Correct Response 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
     12             64.2         49.2          21.5 a       39.5 a          14.3           11.3        -4.29** 
     
     13             64.7 a       73.3 a        26.9         20.4              8.4             6.3        -2.32**      
_______________________________________________________________________ 
a Denotes correct response. 
**significant at ∝ = .05, one-tailed test. 
 
Process of Weighing Mitigating Against Aggravating Circumstances 
 The sentencing instructions necessitate that jurors first determine the existence of 
an aggravating circumstance. If jurors unanimously agree that an aggravator exists, they 
are required to then determine if a mitigator exists. If only one juror believes a mitigating 
circumstance exists, he/she must determine if the mitigator outweighs the aggravator. 
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Again, the instructions do not mention how to guide jurors in the process of weighing one 
set of circumstances against the other (Blankenship et al., 1997). 
 According to the first sample of the study in Table 6, 41.8% of the sample 
answered Scenario 14 incorrectly. In other words, 41.8% of the participants thought it 
was proper to sum up each set of circumstances and then vote on the basis of which 
"side" had the higher total. Responses to Scenario 17 indicate confusion about the 
weighing process: 31.8% of the sample incorrectly believed that an individual mitigating 
circumstance must outweigh all the aggravating circumstances.  
 Scenarios 15 and 16 infer participants' ability to comprehend the law as it relates 
to aggravating circumstances. Unless a mitigator outweighs the aggravator(s), the jury is 
required to vote a sentence of death. Table 6 demonstrates that 72.9% and 82.8% of the 
sample (respectively) understood the instructions. Once again, these results suggest that 
when the instructions are clear and unambiguous, jurors are able to interpret the law 
appropriately. 
 In the second sample, Scenario 14 shows significant improvement from the first 
part of the study, with 64.4% of the sample answering the question correctly, indicating 
that additional explanation in the sentencing instructions cleared some of the ambiguity. 
Scenarios 15 and 16 were nearly comparable to the previous sample, 74.3% and 82.9% 
respectively answered the questions correctly. However, Scenario 17 displayed some 
improvement with 59.1% answering correctly but was not a significant progression from 
sample one.  
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Table 6 
 
Weighing Mitigating Against Aggravating Circumstances (Percentages) 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
       Original    Revised   Original   Revised    Original   Revised 
                  ___________________________________________________ 
Scenario      Yes          Yes            No            No            DK           DK            Z Score 
                                                                                                                        Correct Response 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
     14             41.8         26.3          47.7 a       64.4 a          10.5             9.3        -3.98** 
     
     15             72.9 a       74.3 a        19.0         16.6              8.1             9.1        -.37      
 
     16             82.8 a       82.9 a          8.5         10.7              8.7             6.4        -.03 
 
     17             31.8         28.5          53.3 a       59.1 a          14.9           12.4        -1.35 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
a Denotes correct response. 
**significant at ∝ = .05, one-tailed test. 
 
Summary 
 In sum, 12 of the 17 scenarios indicated significant improvement in the second 
sample that used the revised sentencing instructions. The results indicate that juror 
comprehension of the law and their ability to accurately interpret the law increases when 
the instructions are clear and concise. Additionally, the probability is such that a 
significant proportion of jurors, when using the original instructions given by the state of 
Tennessee, do not fully understand much of the terminology used in the instructions, and 
thus are not accurately following the law as it is written and intended to be carried out. 
More importantly, participants in the current study revealed a consistent bias across the 
scenarios that was to the defendants disadvantage. In short, when errors were made, 
jurors were more likely to send a defendant to death row.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
 Prior research has shown that revised instructions produce a higher level of 
comprehension among jurors concerning the law and its application (e.g., Luginbuhl, 
1992; Severance & Loftus, 1982, 1984). Severance and Loftus (1982) found that errors in 
comprehension were consistently lower when revised rather than pattern instructions 
were provided. Further, they determined that revised instructions led subjects to agree 
more strongly with correct applications of specific legal concepts than did pattern 
instructions. Moreover, the study provided that more legally knowledgeable respondents 
were more likely to acquit in the case. 
Severance and Loftus (1984) established that psycholinguistic changes in pattern 
sentencing instructions can improve jurors’ abilities to comprehend and apply jury 
instructions. The most significant result was the effect of the overall improvement in 
participants’ abilities to apply the instructions after receiving revised instructions rather 
than pattern or no instructions. 
 Luginbuhl’s (1992) study used a revised set of instructions that focused on 
mitigating circumstances. Additional explanations were provided to the North Carolinian 
respondents as to the requirements needed for determining the existence of mitigators and 
of the decision rules for the final determination of life versus death. He determined that 
subjects’ understanding of the decision criteria used in determining the existence of 
mitigating circumstances, as well as the role played by mitigating circumstances in the 
final decision regarding death, were inadequately understood by those exposed to the old 
or pattern instructions where an actual defendant was sentenced to death. Thus, it appears 
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that unless the legal decision rules are clearly defined in the sentencing instructions, 
jurors are likely to misunderstand the legal criteria for deciding the existence and role of 
mitigating circumstances, which ultimately enhances the likelihood that a defendant will 
be wrongly sentenced to death. 
 Blankenship et al. (1997) tested juror comprehension of Tennessee sentencing 
instructions and determined that comprehension is better when the instructions are clear 
and concise. Conversely, when the instructions omit serious points regarding the law, 
jurors' comprehension is extremely limited. This is evident in jurors' understanding of 
aggravators versus mitigators. Tennessee sentencing instructions are much clearer and 
concise on the issue of aggravating circumstances whereby specific aggravators are 
delineated. However, the instructions are much less clear on the issue of mitigating 
circumstances. Thus, Blankenship et al. found that 58.2% of their sample believed they 
knew what a mitigator was compared to 72.9% who said they knew what an aggravator 
was after reading the instructions.  
 Frank and Applegate (1998), using a sample from Ohio, also concluded that juror 
comprehension increased significantly for those participants who were exposed to the 
rewritten instructions. Furthermore, the jurors who heard the new instructions and also 
had access to a written copy of the instructions correctly answered the greatest number of 
questions.  
The current study also assessed improvement in juror comprehension with revised 
sentencing instructions, focusing more attention on understanding of mitigators and 
aggravators. To test improvement, a follow up study to the first sample conducted by 
Blankenship et al. (1997) was officiated. An identical questionnaire to the first sample 
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was used; whereby, jurors read and answered scenarios relating to principles of the 
sentencing instructions. A copy of the revised instructions was provided in the 
questionnaire. The present study’s findings were comparable to and consistent with prior 
research concerning the ability to improve sentencing instructions. 
Jury unanimity on the existence of mitigating circumstances proved problematic 
in the first sample in the study. After additional explanation in the revised instructions of 
the second sample, jurors displayed a marked improvement of level of understanding of 
this issue. However, jury unanimity of weighing mitigators against aggravators seemed a 
little clearer to the respondents than determining the existence of mitigators. Indeed this 
was thought to be the case due to the detail provided in the original pattern instructions, 
which clearly states that the jury must be unanimous in determining that a mitigating 
circumstance outweighs the aggravating circumstance. Thus, a significant majority of 
participants in both waves of the study consistently answered this set of questions 
correctly.  
Because little or no guidance is given in the original instructions concerning 
nonenumerated mitigating circumstances, participants in the first sample of the study 
showed low comprehension on questions measuring this concept. However, the revised 
instructions used in sample two provided a lengthier explanation of the issue that resulted 
in increased comprehension compared to the first sample.  
The standard for proving the existence of a mitigating circumstance is much lower 
than that of an aggravating circumstance. Again, the original sentencing instructions do 
not provide any direction as to the level of proof required for proving the existence of a 
mitigating circumstance. Thus, the majority of the sample in the first part of the study 
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displayed a very low comprehension level of this issue, but sample two provided an 
improvement of comprehension.  
Finally, the current study found that jurors maintained a higher level of 
understanding of the process of weighing mitigating circumstances against aggravating 
circumstances as compared to the first sample of the study. However, the level of 
improvement was not significant, which indicates that additional information is needed in 
explaining the meaning of this issue.   
 
Limitations of the Study 
In light of the findings, this study consisted of a number of limitations that may 
have an unknown effect on the results and, thus, cannot be overlooked. First, the sample 
was somewhat small and limited to one county in Tennessee. Therefore, findings may 
have been the result of some unknown systematic bias limiting their generalizability to 
the entire population. However, numerous prior studies have found consistent results 
lending support to the current study.  
Another factor is that jurors did not deliberate as jurors. Thus, the participants 
were not exposed to the pressures of being part of the adjudication process and, so, did 
not possess any information about a specific defendant (Hans, 1988; Severance & Loftus, 
1982). Moreover, actual jurors might become somewhat more familiar with the legal 
terminology if participating in an actual trial. In other words, jurors typically have the 
trial as their source for the facts of a case, but only the instructions as the source of law. 
Nonetheless, Diamond (1993) states that the testing approach that most accurately 
provides for assessing juror comprehension of judicial instructions involves the 
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presentation of a set of instructions and an immediate assessment of juror comprehension, 
offered by the current study and used in the Free (1992) case. 
Lastly, death eligible and ineligible jurors were not evaluated separately, which 
could have a profound effect on the results. Participants who are death eligible or 
ineligible, for that matter, believe so strongly in their position concerning the death 
penalty that their answers to the questions may become skewed because of such strong 
opinions. In other words, one overlooks the law as it is stated to fit with his/her personal 
belief system.  
However, despite these limitations, the study provides evidence that juror 
comprehension of sentencing instructions is lacking and that understandability can be 
improved. As such, the results presented here challenge whether the discretion of jurors is 
being adequately guided as the U.S. Supreme Court indicated in earlier findings (e.g., 
Gregg v Georgia, 1976; Jurek v Texas, 1976; Profitt v Florida, 1976).  If it is not, which 
has been demonstrated by the inadequate instructions, then the critical role of jurors in 
the sentencing phase of death penalty cases needs to be reexamined.  
 
Policy Implications 
The literature on jury comprehension consistently demonstrates that sentencing 
instructions used during the penalty phase of a capital trial are in desperate need of 
improvement, and the evidence presented here reveals that Tennessee is no exception. 
However, social science research largely tends to be ignored, especially in appellate 
courts (Tanford, 1991). Tanford found that appellate courts have instead moved in the 
direction contradicted by empirical data. He states that appellate courts actually now 
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require less effective instruction procedures despite data suggesting how to improve the 
procedures. This coincides with a growing body of research that establishes that courts 
tend to feign ignorance of social science data and actually prefer to base laws on 
expediency, precedent, and intuition (Haney, 1980; Lempert, 1988; Saks & Baron, 1980; 
Tanford, 1991).  
Acker (1991) found significant use of social science research in U.S. Supreme 
Court capital punishment cases. He found that death penalty cases reflect greater citation 
and discussion of social science data than many other Supreme Court criminal decisions. 
However, the majority of citations occurred in dissenting opinions and with a few 
exceptions, justices typically ignore research findings presented during capital 
punishment cases. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court’s review of jury instructions has been 
close-minded. According to the Court, the jury trial system depends on the “crucial 
assumption…that juries will follow the instructions given by the trial judge” (Parker v 
Randolph, 1979, p. 73). 
Appellate review of jury instructions has tended to focus on the extent to which 
instructions reflect the law, scrutinizing instructions for legal accuracy while ignoring 
jury comprehensibility. In many cases where appellate courts have acknowledged jury 
misunderstanding, the courts will accept the mistake, not rendering the error great enough 
to reverse (Cho, 1994). For example, in Sellers v United States (1979), the jurors 
misunderstood a self-defense instruction and found the defendant guilty of homicide. 
However, jurors later stated that they would have acquitted the defendant if they had 
understood the instruction. The court refused to reverse the verdict. 
 78
In Gacy v Welborn (1993), the court gave little concern to a juror comprehension 
study suggesting that jurors did not adequately understand the Illinois death penalty 
pattern instructions. Admittedly, the court conceded that difficulties with the instructions 
that reduce the quality of “justice” existed (p. 314) but nonetheless resigned itself to the 
imperfections of the system.  “[E]ven [a] ‘simplified’ charge would leave many jurors 
dumbfounded…As there are no perfect trials, so there are no perfect instructions” (p. 
314). 
In the aforementioned cases, courts assumed that jurors will follow the law as 
they are instructed, accepted errors as minor glitches in the system, and conceded that the 
law is so complicated that even a simplified version would confuse the average layman. 
In other words, courts tend to confuse the trial as being the source of the law instead of 
the source of the facts of the case. Therefore, the courts continue to ignore the empirical 
data that suggest jurors do not understand the sentencing instructions presented to them in 
capital cases. Further, they continue to ignore data that demonstrate an unequivocal 
improvement in comprehension when additional information is provided in the 
instructions. 
 
Future Research 
Future research into alternative avenues of improving juror comprehension of 
sentencing instructions is not limited to those variables used in the current research. In 
fact, there are many facets to the juror instruction process that have yet to be tested 
thoroughly enough to make a compelling argument that these alternatives do improve 
comprehension. It has been suggested that the best way to redress comprehension 
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difficulties in jury instructions includes a collaboration among attorneys and/or judges, 
psychologists, and linguists (Diamond & Levi, 1996).  Possible improvements that need 
further testing include but are not limited to, timing of the reading of instructions, 
providing a written copy of instructions, and using closing arguments to supplement 
instruction to the jury, all of which are designed primarily to yield recall. 
It has been shown that providing jurors with the instructions at the beginning of 
the trial, instead of only at the end of the trial, helps jurors to better distinguish the 
evidence as it is presented and to later recall it (Elwork et al., 1977; Strawn & 
Munsterman, 1982). Also, preinstruction allows for better organization of evidence. 
Research has shown that recall is improved when one has an overall organization system 
(Bransford & Johnson, 1972). Likewise, it has been found that preliminary instruction 
does assist the juror with following legal guidelines in their decision making (Heuer & 
Penrod, 1989). 
Weltner stated that “the written charge is an absolute essential to a modern 
judicial system” (Weltner, 1979, p. 22). He further stated that if juries are reliable enough 
to determine if a defendant lives or dies based on an oral charge, it must also be trusted to 
read a charge, which can be referred to as often as needed for improved understanding.  
Written instructions could reduce disputes among jurors debating specific issues. 
Comprehension could also be improved by having a tangible copy of the instructions in 
front of them at all times. 
Lastly, penalty phase arguments could be used to supplement and clarify judicial 
instructions by defining some of the critical terms of capital punishment cases, to 
categorize specific factors to be weighed by jurors in reaching their verdicts, and to better 
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delineate the process of decision making in a capital case (Haney & Lynch, 1997). Of 
course, none of these suggestions will assure 100% comprehension. However, these 
suggestions used simultaneously along with improved clarification of central terminology 
could possibly significantly increase comprehension.  
Another avenue to pursue in order to assure qualified jurors' are sitting in 
judgement of defendants is that of more competent capital defense attorneys. These 
attorneys need better training in jury selection and summation. Further, increased funds 
for providing expert witnesses in capital cases should be considered. In doing so, jurors 
are better exposed to points of the law that may prove to be confusing in the sentencing 
instructions. Thus, comprehension levels have the potential to increase. 
 
Conclusion 
This research suggests that jurors do not understand judicial sentencing 
instructions in capital punishment cases, but comprehension can be improved by 
including additional clarification in the instructions. The current findings are added 
evidence that lawmakers need to investigate thoroughly the possibility of amending the 
judicial sentencing instructions so that average laypersons better understand their 
required duty when sitting on a jury panel. Moreover, this research draws increased 
attention to the fact that defendants are consistently being sentenced to death by jurors 
who do not correctly understand the law as it was meant to be applied. This and other 
research could potentially benefit court officials, lawmakers, and defendants alike, 
because those upheld to carry out judgment could be better informed, thus, decreasing 
possible grounds for appeal and eliminating some of the back log of the court system. 
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Furthermore, those persons convicted of crimes will receive a more constitutionally fair 
trial.  
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APPENDICES 
 
 
Appendix A.  Original Death Penalty Instructions 
 
 Members of the Jury, you have now found the defendant guilty of Murder in the 
First Degree as charged in the indictment. 
 
 It is now your duty to determine within the limits prescribed by law, the penalty 
which shall be imposed as punishment for this offense.  Section 39-2404 provides that 
upon a trial for Murder in the First Degree, should the jury find the defendant guilty of 
murder in the first degree, they shall not fix the punishment as part of their verdict, but 
the jury shall fix the punishment in a separate sentencing hearing to determine whether 
the defendant shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. 
 
 In arriving at this determination, you are authorized to weigh and consider any 
mitigating circumstances and any of the statutory aggravating circumstances which may 
have been raised by the evidence throughout the entire course of this trial, including the 
guilt finding phase or the sentencing phase or both. The Jury are the sole judges of the 
facts, and of the law as it applies to the facts in the case. In making up your verdicts, you 
are to consider the law in connection with the facts; but the Court is the proper source 
from which you are to get the law. In other words, you are the judges of the law as well 
as the facts under the direction of the Court. 
 
 The burden of proof is upon the State to prove any statutory aggravating 
circumstances or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt to a moral certainty. 
 
 Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by an investigation of all the proof in 
the case and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easily upon the 
certainty of your verdicts. Reasonable doubt does not mean a doubt that may arise from 
possibility. Absolute certainty is not demanded by law but moral certainty is required and 
this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the 
verdicts. The law makes you, the Jury, the sole and exclusive judges of the credibility of 
the witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence. The law heretofore submitted to 
you, the Jury, is hereby incorporated in this charge as was given to you in the guilt 
finding phase and you may refer to these instructions in your deliberations. 
 
 
Credibility of Witnesses 
 
 You will take all of the evidence adduced in the case by the State and the 
defendant and give it a full, fair and impartial consideration. If there are any conflicts in 
the statements of the different witnesses, it is your duty to reconcile them, if you can, for 
the law presumes that every witness has sworn to the truth; but, if you cannot, the law 
makes you the sole and exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight 
to be given their testimony. In forming your opinion as to the credibility of a witness, you 
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may look to the proof, if any, of his general character, the manner and demeanor of the 
witness, the consistency or inconsistency of his statements, their probability or 
improbability, his ability and willingness to speak the truth, his intelligence and means of 
knowledge, his motive to speak the truth or swear to a falsehood, his interest or lack of 
interest in the outcome of the trial. 
 
 When the defendant makes himself a witness in his own behalf, his credibility is 
to be determined by the same rules that the credibility of other witnesses is determined, 
and you will give to the defendant's testimony in the case such weight as you may think it 
entitled to. 
 
 
Impeaching a Witness 
 
 There are several modes of impeaching a witness. One mode is to prove by 
credible witnesses that they know the general character of the assailed witness and from 
that general character they would not believe him on oath in a Court of justice. The fact 
that the character of the witness is assailed by a single witness, casts a reproach upon him 
and when the general character of the witness is assailed upon the one hand and sustained 
upon the other by witnesses, it then becomes a question to be decided upon by the Jury 
like all other questions of fact and is not to be judged by the number of witnesses for or 
against but by the respectability, intelligence, consistency and means of information. 
 
 Another mode is to prove that a witness has, at different times, made conflicting 
statements as to material facts of the case as to which he testifies. Still another mode is by 
rigid and close cross-examination to involve the witness in contradictions and 
discrepancies as to the material facts stated by him. Immaterial discrepancies or 
differences in the statements of witnesses do not affect their credibility unless there is 
something to show that they originated in a willful falsehood and, you, gentlemen of the 
Jury, are to determine how far the testimony of any impeached witness has been impaired 
by any invalidating process. 
 
 The Jury are the sole judges of the facts. Expert witnesses have been allowed to 
testify as to certain matters of issue in this case, and to state this opinion. With reference 
to this testimony, which you should consider and judge alone with all the other proof, the 
Court charges you that it should be received with caution. While this kind of testimony is 
sometimes the only means, or the best way to reach the truth, yet it is largely a field of 
speculation, beset with pitfalls and uncertainties, and requires patient and intelligent 
consideration to reach the truth. You should give it the same consideration as all the other 
proof, governed by the same rules to arrive at the truth, as you are governed by in your 
consideration of all the proof. 
 
 Section 39-2404, Sub-section (i), Tennessee Code Annotated, provides that no 
death penalty shall be imposed by a Jury but upon an unanimous finding of the existence 
of one or more of the statutory aggravating circumstances, which shall be limited to the 
following: 
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 1. The Murder was committed against a person less that twelve years of age and the 
 defendant was eighteen years of age or older. 
 2. The defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies, other than the  
 present charge, which involve the use or threat of violence to the person. 
 3. The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to two or more persons,  
 other than the victim murdered, during his act of murder. 
 4. The defendant committed the murder for remuneration or the promise of  
 remuneration, or employed another to commit the murder for remuneration 
 or the promise of remuneration. 
 5. The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture 
 or depravity of mind. 
 
 The Court further instructs you as to the meaning of: 
  "Heinous" means extremely wicked or shockingly evil. 
  "Atrocious" means outrageously wicked and vile. 
  "Cruel" means designed to inflict a high degree of pain, utter indifference 
  to, or enjoyment of, the suffering of others, pitiless. 
 
 6. The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or  
 preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another. 
 7. The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in committing, or 
 was an accomplice in the commission of, or was attempting to commit, or was 
 fleeing after committing or attempting to commit, any first degree murder, arson, 
 rape, robbery, burglary, larceny, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or unlawful  
 throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive device or bomb. 
 8. The murder was committed by the defendant while he was in lawful custody or 
 in a place of lawful confinement or during his escape from lawful custody or from  
 a place of lawful confinement. 
 9. The murder was committed against any peace officer, corrections official,  
 corrections employee or fireman, who was engaged in the performance of his  
 duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that such victim 
 was a peace officer, corrections official, corrections employee or fireman,  
 engaged in the performance of his duties. 
10. The murder was committed against any present or former judge, district attorney 
 general or state attorney general, assistant district attorney general, or assistant 
 state attorney general due to or because of the exercise of his official duty or  
 status and the defendant knew that the victim occupies or occupied said office. 
11. The murder was committed against a national, state, or local popularly elected 
 official, due to or because of the official's lawful duties or status, and the  
 defendant knew that the victim was such an official. 
 
 Section 39-2404, Subsection (j), Tennessee Code Annotated, provides that in 
arriving at the punishment, the Jury shall consider as heretofore indicated, any mitigating 
circumstances which shall include but not be limited to the following: 
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 1. The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity; 
 2. The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of 
 extreme mental or emotional disturbance; 
 3. The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the act; 
 4. The murder was committed under circumstances which the defendant reasonably 
 believed to provide a moral justification for his conduct; 
 5. The defendant was an accomplice in the murder committed by another person and 
 the defendant's participation was relatively minor; 
 6. The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of  
 another person; 
 7. The youth or advanced age of the defendant at the time of the crime; 
 8. The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to 
 conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired as 
 a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication which was insufficient to  
 establish a defense to the crime but which substantially affected his judgment. 
 
 If you unanimously determine that at least one statutory aggravating circumstance 
or several statutory aggravating circumstances have been proved by the State, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and said circumstance or circumstances are not outweighed by any 
mitigating circumstances, the sentence shall be death. The Jury shall state in writing the 
statutory aggravating circumstance or statutory aggravating circumstances so found, and 
signify in writing that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to 
outweigh the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances so found. 
 
 As to each specific defendant, you will write your findings and verdicts on the 
enclosed forms attached hereto and made a part of this charge. Your verdicts should be as 
follows: 
 
 (1) We, the Jury, unanimously find the following listed statutory aggravating  
       circumstance or circumstances; 
       (The Jury will then list the statutory aggravating circumstance or  
       circumstances so found beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 (2) We, the Jury, unanimously find that there are no mitigating circumstances 
       sufficiently substantial to outweigh the statutory aggravating circumstance 
       or circumstances so listed above. 
 (3) Therefore, we, the Jury, unanimously find that the punishment shall be death. 
 
 The verdicts must be unanimous and each Juror must sign their name beneath the 
verdicts. 
 
 If you unanimously determine that no statutory aggravating circumstances has 
been proved by the State beyond a reasonable doubt; or if the Jury unanimously 
determine that a statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proved 
by the State beyond a reasonable doubt; but that said statutory aggravating circumstance 
or circumstances are outweighed by one or more mitigating circumstances, the sentence 
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shall be life imprisonment. You will write your verdicts upon the enclosed forms attached 
hereto and made part of this charge. 
 
 
 The verdict should be as follows: 
 
 "We, the Jury, unanimously find that the punishment shall be life imprisonment." 
 
 The verdict must be unanimous and signed by each Juror. 
 
 The Jury in no case, should have any sympathy or prejudice or allow anything but 
the law and evidence to have any influence upon them in determining their verdicts. They 
should render their verdicts with absolute fairness and impartiality as they think truth and 
justice dictate. Take the case, consider all the evidence fairly and impartially and report 
your verdicts to the Court. 
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Appendix B.  Revised Death Penalty Instructions 
 
Members of the Jury, you have now found the defendant guilty of Murder in the 
First Degree as charged in the indictment. 
 
It is now your duty to determine within the limits prescribed by law, the penalty 
which shall be imposed as punishment for this offense. Section 39-2404 provides that 
upon a trial for Murder in the First Degree, should the jury find the defendant guilty of 
Murder in the First Degree, they shall not fix the punishment as part of their verdict, but 
the jury shall fix the punishment in a separate sentencing hearing to determine whether 
the defendant shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. 
 
In arriving at this determination, you are authorized to weigh and consider any 
mitigating circumstances and any of the statutory aggravating circumstances which may 
have been raised by the evidence throughout the entire course of this trial, including the 
guilty finding phase or the sentencing phase or both. The Jury are the sole judges of the 
facts, and of the law as it applies to the facts in the case. In making up your verdicts, you 
are to consider the law in connection with the facts; but the Court is the proper source 
from which you are to get the law. In other words, you are the judges of the law as well 
as the facts under the direction of the Court. 
 
The burden of proof is upon the State to prove any statutory aggravating 
circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt to a moral certainty. 
 
Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by an investigation of all the proof in 
the case and in an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easily upon the 
certainty of your verdicts. Reasonable doubt does not mean a doubt that may arise from 
possibility. Absolute certainty is not demanded by law but moral certainty is required and 
this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the 
verdicts. The law makes you, the Jury, the sole and exclusive judges of the credibility of 
the witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence. The law heretofore submitted to 
you, the Jury, is hereby incorporated in this charge as was given to you in the guilt 
finding phase and you may refer to these instructions in your deliberations. 
 
Credibility of Witnesses 
 
You will take all of the evidence adduced in the case by the State and the 
defendant and give it a full, fair and impartial consideration. If there are any conflicts in 
the statements of the different witnesses, it is your duty to reconcile them, if you can, for 
the law presumes that every witness has sworn to the truth; but, if you cannot, the law 
makes you the sole and exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight 
to be given their testimony. In forming your opinion as to the credibility of a witness, you  
may look to the proof, if any, of his general character, the manner and demeanor of the 
witness, the consistency or inconsistency of his statements, their probability or 
improbability, his ability and willingness to speak the truth, his intelligence and means of 
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knowledge, his motive to speak the truth or swear to a falsehood, his interest or lack of 
interest in the outcome of the trial. 
 
When the defendant makes himself a witness in his own behalf, his credibility is 
to be determined by the same rules that the credibility of other witness [sic] is 
determined, and you will give to defendant's testimony in the case such weight as you 
may think it entitled to. 
 
Impeaching a Witness 
 
There are several modes of impeaching a witness. One mode is to prove by 
credible witnesses that they know the general character of the assailed witness and from 
that general character they would not believe him on oath in a Court of justice. The fact 
that the character of the witness is assailed by a single witness, casts a reproach upon him 
and when the general character of the witness is assailed upon the one hand and sustained 
upon the other by witnesses, it then becomes a question to be decided upon by the Jury 
like all other questions of fact and is not to be judged by the number of witnesses for or 
against but by the respectability, intelligence, consistency, and means of information. 
 
Another mode is to prove that a witness has, at different times, made conflicting 
statements as to material facts of the case as to which he testifies. Still another mode is by 
rigid and close cross-examination to involve the witness in contradictions and 
discrepancies as to the material facts stated by him. Immaterial discrepancies or 
differences in the statements of witnesses do not affect their credibility unless there is 
something to show that they originated in a willful falsehood and, you, gentlemen of the 
Jury, are to determine how far the testimony of any impeached witness has been impaired 
by any invalidating process. 
 
The Jury are the sole judges of the facts. Expert witnesses have been allowed to 
testify as to certain matters of issue in this case, and to state his opinion. With reference 
to this testimony, which you should consider and judge along with all the other proof, the 
Court charges you that it should be received with caution. While this kind of testimony is 
sometimes the only means, or the best way to reach the truth, yet it is largely a field of 
speculation, beset with pitfalls and uncertainties, and requires patient and intelligent 
consideration to reach the truth. You should give it the same consideration as all the other 
proof, governed by the same rules to arrive at the truth, as you are governed by in your 
consideration of all the proof.  
 
Section 39-2404, Sub-section (i), Tennessee Code Annotated, provides that no 
death penalty shall be imposed by a jury but upon unanimous finding of the existence of 
one or more of the statutory aggravating circumstances, which shall be limited to the 
following: 
 
1. The Murder was committed against a person less than twelve years of age and the 
defendant was eighteen years of age or older. 
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2. The defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies, other than they 
present charge, which involve the use or threat of violence to the person. 
3. The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to two or more persons, 
other than the victim murdered, during his act of murder. 
4. The defendant committed the murder for remuneration or the promise of 
remuneration, or employed another to commit the murder for remuneration or the 
promise of remuneration. 
5. The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture 
 or depravity of mind. 
 
 The Court further instructs you as to the meaning of: 
  "Heinous" means extremely wicked or shockingly evil. 
  "Atrocious" means outrageously wicked and vile. 
  "Cruel" means designed to inflict a high degree of pain, utter indifference 
  to, or enjoyment of, the suffering of others, pitiless. 
 
6. The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or  
 preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another. 
7. The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in committing, or 
 was an accomplice in the commission of, or was attempting to commit, or was 
 fleeing after committing or attempting to commit, any first degree murder, arson, 
 rape, robbery, burglary, larceny, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or unlawful  
 throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive device or bomb. 
8. The murder was committed by the defendant while he was in lawful custody or 
 in a place of lawful confinement or during his escape from lawful custody or from  
 a place of lawful confinement. 
9. The murder was committed against any peace officer, corrections official,  
 corrections employee or fireman, who was engaged in the performance of his  
 duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that such victim 
 was a peace officer, corrections official, corrections employee or fireman,  
 engaged in the performance of his duties. 
10. The murder was committed against any present or former judge, district attorney 
 general or state attorney general, assistant district attorney general, or assistant 
 state attorney general due to or because of the exercise of his official duty or  
 status and the defendant knew that the victim occupies or occupied said office. 
11. The murder was committed against a national, state, or local popularly elected 
 official, due to or because of the official's lawful duties or status, and the  
 defendant knew that the victim was such an official. 
 
 The jury may not consider any statutory aggravating circumstance unless all 
twelve members of the jury unanimously determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that such 
aggravating circumstance or circumstances exist. The jury may not consider any factors 
as aggravating circumstances except those statutory aggravating circumstance(s) it finds 
the state to have proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  
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 Thus, if any juror or jurors find that the state has not proven a statutory 
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury shall not weigh that 
statutory aggravating circumstance in determining the appropriate sentence. However, if 
all twelve jurors agree that the state has proven a statutory aggravating circumstance 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury shall then weigh the aggravating circumstance when 
determining the appropriate sentence. 
  
If the jury does not unanimously find that the State has proven any statutory 
aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the sentence shall be life 
imprisonment. You will write your verdict upon the enclosed form attached hereto and 
made a part of this charge. 
  
Section 39-2404, Subsection (j), Tennessee Code Annotated, provides that in 
arriving at the punishment, if the jury unanimously finds a statutory aggravating 
circumstance, the Jury must consider any mitigating circumstances which shall include, 
but which are not limited to, the following: 
 
1. The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity; 
2. The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance; 
3. The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the act; 
4. The murder was committed under circumstances which the defendant reasonably 
believed to provide a moral justification for his conduct; 
5. The defendant was an accomplice in the murder committed by another person and 
the defendant's participation was relatively minor;  
6. The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of 
another person; 
7. The youth or advanced age of the defendant at the time of the crime; 
8. The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired as 
a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication which was insufficient to 
establish a defense to the crime but which substantially affected his judgment. 
 
A mitigating circumstance is any aspect of the defendant's history, background, 
character or mental state or any circumstance surrounding the criminal offense which, in 
fairness and mercy, weighs in favor of a life sentence. A mitigating circumstance is any 
circumstance which provides a reason for imposing a life sentence. 
 
 Thus, any evidence that helps to explain the offense, or why the defendant 
committed the offense may be a mitigating circumstance if such evidence provides a 
reason why a life sentence is a more appropriate punishment than a death sentence. Any 
evidence concerning the defendant's background, character, mental state, or personal 
history is a mitigating circumstance, if such evidence demonstrates a reason why a life 
sentence is more appropriate than a death sentence in this case. 
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 A mitigating circumstance need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not 
necessary that all twelve jurors agree on the existence of any mitigating circumstance 
before it may be considered by an individual jurors in determining the appropriate 
sentence. A mitigating circumstance may be found by any one of you individually so 
long as there is evidence that shows that they mitigating circumstance exists. 
 
 Thus, if any of you find that a particular aspect of the offense or of the defendant's 
background, character, personal history, or mental state is a mitigating circumstance, and 
that there is evidence supporting that circumstance, you individually may consider and 
weight that mitigating circumstance when making your determination whether the 
appropriate sentence is life or death in this case. 
 
 The court listed for you certain statutory mitigating circumstances that you as 
jurors shall consider when deciding whether life imprisonment or death is the appropriate 
sentence. This is not an exclusive list of all possible mitigating circumstances which you 
may consider in this case. Rather, you are free to consider as a mitigating circumstance 
any aspect of the defendant's character, background or history, or the circumstances 
surrounding the crime which you find to be mitigating, even if it has not been specifically 
listed as a possible mitigating circumstance in these instructions. You are not limited to 
considering only those mitigating circumstances specifically listed. You may find any 
mitigating circumstance and give it the weight you deem appropriate regardless of 
whether or not it is one of the listed mitigating circumstances.  
 
 When weighing the aggravating circumstances proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
against mitigating circumstances, you shall not simply count the number of aggravating 
circumstances and mitigating circumstances. Instead, you shall consider the significance 
of each aggravating circumstance and the significance of each mitigating circumstance 
when weighing them to determine the appropriate sentence. For example, it is possible 
that one mitigating circumstance could outweigh three aggravating circumstances, or that 
two aggravating circumstances could outweigh three mitigating circumstances. 
 
 The weight you assign to any mitigating circumstance shall not depend upon 
whether or not it has been listed in these instructions. Rather, whether a mitigating 
circumstance is listed or not, the weight you give that circumstance shall depend on your 
determination of the significance of that mitigating circumstance. 
 
 If you unanimously determine that at least one statutory aggravating circumstance 
or several statutory aggravating circumstances have been proved by the State, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and said circumstance or circumstances are not outweighed by any 
mitigating circumstances, the sentence shall be death. The Jury shall state in writing the 
statutory aggravating circumstance or statutory aggravating circumstances so found, and 
signify in writing that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to 
outweigh the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances so found. 
 
 
 
 102
 As to each specific defendant, you will write your findings and verdicts on the 
enclosed forms attached hereto and made a part of this change. Your verdicts should be 
as follows: 
 
(1) We, the Jury, unanimously find the following listed statutory aggravating 
circumstance or circumstances; 
 
 (The Jury will then list the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances so 
found beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 
(2) We, the Jury, unanimously find that there are no mitigating circumstances 
sufficiently substantial to outweigh the statutory aggravating circumstance or 
circumstances so listed above. 
 
(3) Therefore, we, the Jury, unanimously find that the punishment shall be death. 
 
The verdicts must be unanimous and each Juror must sign their name beneath the 
verdicts. 
 
 If you unanimously determine that no statutory aggravating circumstance has 
been proved by the State beyond a reasonable doubt; of [sic] if the Jury unanimously 
determines that a statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proved 
by the State beyond a reasonable doubt; but that said statutory aggravating circumstance 
or circumstances are outweighed by one or more mitigating circumstances, the sentence 
shall be life imprisonment. You will write your verdicts upon the enclosed forms attached 
hereto and made a part of this charge. 
 
 The verdict should be as follows: 
 
 "We, the Jury, unanimously find that the punishment shall be life imprisonment." 
  
 The verdict must be unanimous and signed by each Juror. 
 
 The Jury in no case, should have any sympathy or prejudice or allow anything but 
the law and evidence to have any influence upon them in determining their verdicts. They 
should render their verdicts with absolute fairness and impartiality ass [sic] they think 
truth and justice dictate. Take the case, consider all the evidence fairly and impartially 
and report your verdicts to the Court. 
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Appendix C.  Survey Questions: Jury Unanimity on Existence of Mitigating 
Circumstances 
 
 1. The defendant was only 25 years of age when he committed the murder. A juror 
 decides that the defendant's age is a mitigating circumstance. However, the other 
 eleven jurors disagree and insist that his age is not a mitigating circumstance. 
 This one juror believes that she cannot consider a mitigating circumstance unless 
 the entire jury unanimously agrees that it exists. She therefore votes for the death 
 penalty.  (Correct answer=No) 
 2. One juror decides from the evidence that the defendant cooperated with the  
 police. The same juror decides that the defendant's cooperation is a mitigating 
 circumstance. The other eleven jurors argue that such cooperation cannot be  
 considered since they do not all agree that it is a mitigating circumstance. The 
 one juror decides to consider the defendant's cooperation with the police as a  
 mitigating circumstance, despite the disagreement with the other eleven jurors. 
 (Correct answer=Yes) 
 3. Eleven jurors decide from the evidence that the defendant was abused as a child. 
 The same eleven jurors decide that this history of child abuse is a mitigating 
 circumstance. One juror disagrees that such abuse is a mitigating circumstance.  
 Since the jurors cannot unanimously agree that being abused as a child is a  
 mitigating circumstance, they do not consider it any further. (Correct answer= 
 No)  
 4. One juror decides from the evidence that the defendant was good to his family. 
 This one juror decides that this is a mitigating circumstance. The eleven other  
 jurors disagree. They insist that no juror should consider the defendant's good  
 relations with his family as a mitigating circumstance unless all twelve jurors 
 agree that it is a mitigating circumstance. As a result, the one juror does not  
 consider the defendant's being good to his family as a mitigating circumstance. 
 (Correct answer=No) 
 
 
Jury Unanimity on Mitigating Circumstances Outweighing Aggravating Circumstances 
 
 5. A juror decides that the fact that the defendant did not directly kill the victim is 
 a mitigating circumstance that outweighs the aggravating circumstances. He 
 is the only juror to believe this, and he votes against imposing the death penalty. 
 (Correct answer=yes) 
 6. Every juror agrees that the defendant was mentally disturbed at the time of the  
 crime. The jurors also agree that this is a mitigating circumstance. However, 
 not all jurors agree that this mitigating circumstance outweighs the aggravating 
 circumstances they have found. The jury therefore votes unanimously to impose 
 the death penalty. (Correct answer=No) 
 7. A juror believes that the mitigating circumstance of the defendant being mentally  
 retarded outweighs the aggravating circumstances. He is the only juror to feel 
 this way, and because of his feelings he votes to impose a life sentence. 
 (Correct answer=Yes) 
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 8. A juror decides from the evidence that the defendant had no significant history 
 of prior criminal activity. The same juror concludes that this lack of prior  
 criminal activity is a mitigating circumstance that outweighs the aggravating 
 circumstances, and the juror votes not to impose the death penalty. (Correct 
 answer=Yes) 
 9. Eleven jurors believe that the defendant's mental disturbance at the time the 
 crime was committed is not a mitigating circumstance. One juror believes that 
 the defendant's mental disturbance is a mitigating circumstance. That same  
 juror decides that the mental state of the defendant outweighs the aggravating  
 circumstances found by the jury, even though none of the other jurors do. The  
 juror votes for life, even though the other jurors tell him that is improper. (Correct 
 answer=Yes) 
 
Comprehension of Non-Enumerated Mitigating Circumstances 
 
10. The jury hears evidence that the defendant was well-behaved as a boy. They also 
 believe that this is mitigating evidence. However, one juror notes that being a  
 good child is not one of the mitigating circumstances that the judge specifically 
 mentioned. For this reason, she concludes that she cannot consider this as a  
 mitigating circumstance. (Correct answer=No) 
11. The jury decides from the evidence that the defendant felt great remorse for  
 committing the murder. They also decide that remorse is a mitigating  
 circumstance, even though remorse was not one of the mitigating circumstances 
 specifically mentioned by the judge. In deciding whether to impose a life 
 sentence or the death penalty, they consider the defendant's remorse as a 
 mitigating circumstance anyway. (Correct answer=Yes) 
 
The Standard for Proving the Existence of Mitigating Circumstances 
 
12. The jury hears evidence that the defendant cooperated with the police. The jury 
 agrees that this is mitigating evidence, but they do not believe it has been proven 
 beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury therefore does not consider the defendant's 
 cooperation as a mitigating circumstance. (Correct answer=No) 
13. The jury hears evidence that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or  
 cruel. Being especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel is an aggravating circumstance 
 under the statute. However, the jury does not believe that the cruelty of the crime 
 has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury therefore does not consider 
 the cruelty of the crime as an aggravating circumstance. (Correct answer=Yes) 
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Mitigating Circumstances Outweigh Aggravating Circumstances 
 
14. The jury finds the existence of three aggravating circumstances and only two 
 mitigating circumstances. Since the jury counted more aggravating circumstances 
 than mitigating circumstances, the jury votes to impose the death penalty. 
 (Correct answer=No) 
15. The jury finds that one aggravating circumstance exists and that no mitigating 
 circumstances exist. They therefore decide they must vote to impose a sentence 
 of death. (Correct answer=Yes) 
16. The jury unanimously agrees that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or 
 cruel. They also agree that this is an aggravating circumstance, and that it is not 
 outweighed by the mitigating circumstances that exist as they interpret the  
 instructions, this means they must vote to impose the death penalty, and they do 
 so. (Correct answer=Yes) 
17. A juror considers all the evidence and comes to the conclusion that the mitigating 
 circumstances, taken together, outweigh the aggravating circumstances and that 
 death is not the appropriate punishment. However, he cannot find any individual 
 mitigating circumstance that outweighs the aggravating circumstances. Therefore,  
 the juror votes to impose the death penalty. (Correct answer=No) 
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Appendix D. Questionnaire Completed by Participants 
 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Please complete the information below. 
 
 
A. Have you ever served on a jury before?  Yes    No 
  
 If yes, what kind of cases were the last two you served on? 
 
 1. _________________________________________ 
 
 2. _________________________________________ 
 
B. Have you ever served as a juror on a death penalty case? 
 
 Yes  ____  No  ____ 
 
C. Please place a check mark [b] by the one statement below which best represents 
your attitude about the death penalty. 
 
a.  ____  I strongly favor the death penalty, and would vote for it in  
  all cases of first degree murder. 
 
b.  ____  I generally favor the death penalty, but would consider  
  evidence presented that a defendant who had been  
  convicted of first degree murder should not be executed, 
  and would sometimes vote for life imprisonment in such  
  cases. 
 
c.  ____  I neither favor nor oppose the death penalty. 
 
d.  ____  I generally oppose the death penalty, but would consider  
  evidence presented that a defendant who had been  
  convicted of first degree murder should be executed, and 
  would sometimes vote for death in such cases. 
 
e.  ____  I strongly oppose the death penalty, and would never vote  
  for it, even in the worst cases of first degree murder. 
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D. If you were a juror in a case where the defendant might get the death penalty, 
could you be a fair and impartial juror and base your decisions solely on the facts 
of the case? 
 
 Yes  ____  No  ____ 
 
E. If you answered "No" to Question D, could you briefly explain. 
 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 
F. In what year were you born?    ____ 
 
G. What is your gender? 
 
 Male  ____  Female  ____ 
 
H. What race do you consider yourself? 
 
 Black  ____ White  ____ Hispanic  ____ Asian  ____ 
 
 Other  __________________________ (please write in) 
 
I. What is the highest educational degree you have earned? 
 
 Less than high school 
 High school/GED 
 Associate/junior/community college 
 Bachelor's 
 Graduate 
 
 
Background Information 
 
 This questionnaire represents an attempt to determine how well jury instructions 
convey to jurors the actual meaning of the law that they are to apply in the sentencing 
stage of a death penalty trial. We do not need to know your identity, so please do not put  
your name on the questionnaire. 
 
 To complete this questionnaire it is necessary to know that a death penalty trial in  
this state is actually two trials in one, with the same jury hearing both trials; or, as 
lawyers and judges put it, it is a "bifurcated" trial. The two trials, or the two stages of the 
bifurcated trial, are: (1) the guilt stage trial, and (2) the sentencing stage trial. A criminal 
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defendant can be eligible for a death penalty trial only if he is charged with first degree 
murder. The second trial, the sentencing stage, will occur only if the jury finds the 
defendant guilty of first degree murder in the first trial, the guilt stage. 
 
   In completing this questionnaire, you are to assume that you are on a jury in a 
death penalty trial in which the defendant is charged with first degree murder. You are 
also to assume that you have already found the defendant guilty of first degree murder in 
the guilt stage (the first stage) of the trial, that you have proceeded to the sentencing stage 
(the second stage), and that you have heard all of the evidence presented by the 
prosecution and the defense regarding sentencing. 
  
 You are now at the point of the sentencing stage of the trial in which the Court 
instructs you concerning the law that you are to apply to the evidence that you have heard 
in order to determine whether a sentence of death or life should be imposed against the 
defendant. 
 
 The instructions of the Court for the sentencing stage of the trial are set out below, 
and after you have read them we ask you to please fill out the attached questionnaire 
according to the instructions that will be provided you. 
 
 Please stop at this point and wait for further instructions. Thank you. 
 
The Court's instructions prior to deliberation on the question of the sentence of life 
or death. 
 
Members of the Jury, you have now found the defendant guilty of Murder in the 
First Degree as charged in the indictment. 
 
It is now your duty to determine within the limits prescribed by law, the penalty 
which shall be imposed as punishment for this offense. Section 39-2404 provides that 
upon a trial for Murder in the First Degree, should the jury find the defendant guilty of 
Murder in the First Degree, they shall not fix the punishment as part of their verdict, but 
the jury shall fix the punishment in a separate sentencing hearing to determine whether 
the defendant shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. 
 
In arriving at this determination, you are authorized to weigh and consider any 
mitigating circumstances and any of the statutory aggravating circumstances which may 
have been raised by the evidence throughout the entire course of this trial, including the 
guilty finding phase or the sentencing phase or both. The Jury are the sole judges of the 
facts, and of the law as it applies to the facts in the case. In making up your verdicts, you 
are to consider the law in connection with the facts; but the Court is the proper source 
from which you are to get the law. In other words, you are the judges of the law as well 
as the facts under the direction of the Court. 
 
The burden of proof is upon the State to prove any statutory aggravating 
circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt to a moral certainty. 
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Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by an investigation of all the proof in 
the case and in an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easily upon the 
certainty of your verdicts. Reasonable doubt does not mean a doubt that may arise from 
possibility. Absolute certainty is not demanded by law but moral certainty is required and 
this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the 
verdicts. The law makes you, the Jury, the sole and exclusive judges of the credibility of 
the witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence. The law heretofore submitted to 
you, the Jury, is hereby incorporated in this charge as was given to you in the guilt 
finding phase and you may refer to these instructions in your deliberations. 
 
Credibility of Witnesses 
 
You will take all of the evidence adduced in the case by the State and the 
defendant and give it a full, fair and impartial consideration. If there are any conflicts in 
the statements of the different witnesses, it is your duty to reconcile them, if you can, for 
the law presumes that every witness has sworn to the truth; but, if you cannot, the law 
makes you the sole and exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight 
to be given their testimony. In forming your opinion as to the credibility of a witness, you  
may look to the proof, if any, of his general character, the manner and demeanor of the 
witness, the consistency or inconsistency of his statements, their probability or 
improbability, his ability and willingness to speak the truth, his intelligence and means of 
knowledge, his motive to speak the truth or swear to a falsehood, his interest or lack of 
interest in the outcome of the trial. 
 
When the defendant makes himself a witness in his own behalf, his credibility is 
to be determined by the same rules that the credibility of other witness [sic] is 
determined, and you will give to defendant's testimony in the case such weight as you 
may think it entitled to. 
 
Impeaching a Witness 
 
There are several modes of impeaching a witness. One mode is to prove by 
credible witnesses that they know the general character of the assailed witness and from 
that general character they would not believe him on oath in a Court of justice. The fact 
that the character of the witness is assailed by a single witness, casts a reproach upon him 
and when the general character of the witness is assailed upon the one hand and sustained 
upon the other by witnesses, it then becomes a question to be decided upon by the Jury 
like all other questions of fact and is not to be judged by the number of witnesses for or 
against but by the respectability, intelligence, consistency, and means of information. 
 
Another mode is to prove that a witness has, at different times, made conflicting 
statements as to material facts of the case as to which he testifies. Still another mode is by 
rigid and close cross-examination to involve the witness in contradictions and 
discrepancies as to the material facts stated by him. Immaterial discrepancies or 
differences in the statements of witnesses do not affect their credibility unless there is 
something to show that they originated in a willful falsehood and, you, gentlemen of the 
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Jury, are to determine how far the testimony of any impeached witness has been impaired 
by any invalidating process. 
 
The Jury are the sole judges of the facts. Expert witnesses have been allowed to 
testify as to certain matters of issue in this case, and to state his opinion. With reference 
to this testimony, which you should consider and judge along with all the other proof, the 
Court charges you that it should be received with caution. While this kind of testimony is 
sometimes the only means, or the best way to reach the truth, yet it is largely a field of 
speculation, beset with pitfalls and uncertainties, and requires patient and intelligent 
consideration to reach the truth. You should give it the same consideration as all the other 
proof, governed by the same rules to arrive at the truth, as you are governed by in your 
consideration of all the proof.  
 
Section 39-2404, Sub-section (i), Tennessee Code Annotated, provides that no 
death penalty shall be imposed by a jury but upon unanimous finding of the existence of 
one or more of the statutory aggravating circumstances, which shall be limited to the 
following: 
 
1. The Murder was committed against a person less than twelve years of age and the 
defendant was eighteen years of age or older. 
2. The defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies, other than they 
present charge, which involve the use or threat of violence to the person. 
3. The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to two or more persons, 
other than the victim murdered, during his act of murder. 
4. The defendant committed the murder for remuneration or the promise of 
remuneration, or employed another to commit the murder for remuneration or the 
promise of remuneration. 
5. The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture 
 or depravity of mind. 
 
 The Court further instructs you as to the meaning of: 
  "Heinous" means extremely wicked or shockingly evil. 
  "Atrocious" means outrageously wicked and vile. 
  "Cruel" means designed to inflict a high degree of pain, utter indifference 
  to, or enjoyment of, the suffering of others, pitiless. 
 
6. The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or  
 preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another. 
7. The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in committing, or 
 was an accomplice in the commission of, or was attempting to commit, or was 
 fleeing after committing or attempting to commit, any first degree murder, arson, 
 rape, robbery, burglary, larceny, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or unlawful  
 throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive device or bomb. 
8. The murder was committed by the defendant while he was in lawful custody or 
 in a place of lawful confinement or during his escape from lawful custody or from  
 a place of lawful confinement. 
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9. The murder was committed against any peace officer, corrections official,  
 corrections employee or fireman, who was engaged in the performance of his  
 duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that such victim 
 was a peace officer, corrections official, corrections employee or fireman,  
 engaged in the performance of his duties. 
10. The murder was committed against any present or former judge, district attorney 
 general or state attorney general, assistant district attorney general, or assistant 
 state attorney general due to or because of the exercise of his official duty or  
 status and the defendant knew that the victim occupies or occupied said office. 
11. The murder was committed against a national, state, or local popularly elected 
 official, due to or because of the official's lawful duties or status, and the  
 defendant knew that the victim was such an official. 
 
 The jury may not consider any statutory aggravating circumstance unless all 
twelve members of the jury unanimously determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that such 
aggravating circumstance or circumstances exist. The jury may not consider any factors 
as aggravating circumstances except those statutory aggravating circumstance(s) it finds 
the state to have proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  
 
 Thus, if any juror or jurors find that the state has not proven a statutory 
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury shall not weigh that 
statutory aggravating circumstance in determining the appropriate sentence. However, if 
all twelve jurors agree that the state has proven a statutory aggravating circumstance 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury shall then weigh the aggravating circumstance when 
determining the appropriate sentence. 
  
If the jury does not unanimously find that the State has proven any statutory 
aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the sentence shall be life 
imprisonment. You will write your verdict upon the enclosed form attached hereto and 
made a part of this charge. 
  
Section 39-2404, Subsection (j), Tennessee Code Annotated, provides that in 
arriving at the punishment, if the jury unanimously finds a statutory aggravating 
circumstance, the Jury must consider any mitigating circumstances which shall include, 
but which are not limited to, the following: 
 
1. The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity; 
2. The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance; 
3. The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the act; 
4. The murder was committed under circumstances which the defendant reasonably 
believed to provide a moral justification for his conduct; 
5. The defendant was an accomplice in the murder committed by another person and 
the defendant's participation was relatively minor;  
6. The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of 
another person; 
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7. The youth or advanced age of the defendant at the time of the crime; 
8. The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired as 
a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication which was insufficient to 
establish a defense to the crime but which substantially affected his judgment. 
 
A mitigating circumstance is any aspect of the defendant's history, background, 
character or mental state or any circumstance surrounding the criminal offense which, in 
fairness and mercy, weighs in favor of a life sentence. A mitigating circumstance is any 
circumstance which provides a reason for imposing a life sentence. 
 
 Thus, any evidence that helps to explain the offense, or why the defendant 
committed the offense may be a mitigating circumstance if such evidence provides a 
reason why a life sentence is a more appropriate punishment than a death sentence. Any 
evidence concerning the defendant's background, character, mental state, or personal 
history is a mitigating circumstance, if such evidence demonstrates a reason why a life 
sentence is more appropriate than a death sentence in this case. 
 
 A mitigating circumstance need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not 
necessary that all twelve jurors agree on the existence of any mitigating circumstance 
before it may be considered by an individual jurors in determining the appropriate 
sentence. A mitigating circumstance may be found by any one of you individually so 
long as there is evidence that shows that they mitigating circumstance exists. 
 
 Thus, if any of you find that a particular aspect of the offense or of the defendant's 
background, character, personal history, or mental state is a mitigating circumstance, and 
that there is evidence supporting that circumstance, you individually may consider and 
weight that mitigating circumstance when making your determination whether the 
appropriate sentence is life or death in this case. 
 
 The court listed for you certain statutory mitigating circumstances that you as 
jurors shall consider when deciding whether life imprisonment or death is the appropriate 
sentence. This is not an exclusive list of all possible mitigating circumstances which you 
may consider in this case. Rather, you are free to consider as a mitigating circumstance 
any aspect of the defendant's character, background or history, or the circumstances 
surrounding the crime which you find to be mitigating, even if it has not been specifically 
listed as a possible mitigating circumstance in these instructions. You are not limited to 
considering only those mitigating circumstances specifically listed. You may find any 
mitigating circumstance and give it the weight you deem appropriate regardless of 
whether or not it is one of the listed mitigating circumstances.  
 
 When weighing the aggravating circumstances proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
against mitigating circumstances, you shall not simply count the number of aggravating 
circumstances and mitigating circumstances. Instead, you shall consider the significance 
of each aggravating circumstance and the significance of each mitigating circumstance 
when weighing them to determine the appropriate sentence. For example, it is possible 
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that one mitigating circumstance could outweigh three aggravating circumstances, or that 
two aggravating circumstances could outweigh three mitigating circumstances. 
 
 The weight you assign to any mitigating circumstance shall not depend upon 
whether or not it has been listed in these instructions. Rather, whether a mitigating 
circumstance is listed or not, the weight you give that circumstance shall depend on your 
determination of the significance of that mitigating circumstance. 
 
 If you unanimously determine that at least one statutory aggravating circumstance 
or several statutory aggravating circumstances have been proved by the State, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and said circumstance or circumstances are not outweighed by any 
mitigating circumstances, the sentence shall be death. The Jury shall state in writing the 
statutory aggravating circumstance or statutory aggravating circumstances so found, and 
signify in writing that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to 
outweigh the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances so found. 
 
 As to each specific defendant, you will write your findings and verdicts on the 
enclosed forms attached hereto and made a part of this change. Your verdicts should be 
as follows: 
 
(1) We, the Jury, unanimously find the following listed statutory aggravating 
circumstance or circumstances; 
 
 (The Jury will then list the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances so 
found beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 
(2) We, the Jury, unanimously find that there are no mitigating circumstances 
sufficiently substantial to outweigh the statutory aggravating circumstance or 
circumstances so listed above. 
 
(3) Therefore, we, the Jury, unanimously find that the punishment shall be death. 
 
The verdicts must be unanimous and each Juror must sign their name beneath the 
verdicts. 
 
 If you unanimously determine that no statutory aggravating circumstance has 
been proved by the State beyond a reasonable doubt; of [sic] if the Jury unanimously 
determines that a statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proved 
by the State beyond a reasonable doubt; but that said statutory aggravating circumstance 
or circumstances are outweighed by one or more mitigating circumstances, the sentence 
shall be life imprisonment. You will write your verdicts upon the enclosed forms attached 
hereto and made a part of this charge. 
 
 The verdict should be as follows: 
 
 "We, the Jury, unanimously find that the punishment shall be life imprisonment." 
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 The verdict must be unanimous and signed by each Juror. 
 
 The Jury in no case, should have any sympathy or prejudice or allow anything but 
the law and evidence to have any influence upon them in determining their verdicts. They 
should render their verdicts with absolute fairness and impartiality ass [sic] they think 
truth and justice dictate. Take the case, consider all the evidence fairly and impartially 
and report your verdicts to the Court. 
 
 
 ______________________________ 
         Judge 
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Questionnaire 
 
 In the following questionnaire, we will ask you about different decisions that 
different jurors or juries might have reached. We are only interested in whether you think 
the juror or jury used the right legal standard in making the decision. You should tell us 
whether the juror (or jury) followed or did not follow the law, as explained in the judge's 
instructions-not whether they reached the result that you would prefer. You may refer 
back to the judge's instructions if you wish. 
 
1. The defendant was only 25 years of age when he committed the murder. A juror 
decides that the defendant's age is a mitigating circumstance. However, the other 
eleven jurors disagree and insist that his age is not a mitigating circumstance. This 
one juror believes that she cannot consider a mitigating circumstance unless the 
entire jury unanimously agrees that it exists. She therefore votes for the death 
penalty. 
 
 Has the juror followed the law in making her decision? 
 
 Yes  ____ No  ____ Do not know  ____ 
 
2. A juror decides that the fact that the defendant did not directly kill the victim is a 
mitigating circumstance that outweighs the aggravating circumstances. He is the 
only juror to believe this, and he votes against imposing the death penalty. 
 
 Has the juror followed the law in making his decision? 
 
 Yes  ____ No  ____ Do not know  ____ 
 
3. The jury hears evidence that the defendant cooperated with the police. The jury 
agrees that this is mitigating evidence, but they do not believe it has been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury therefore does not consider the defendants' 
cooperation as a mitigating circumstance.  
 
 Has the jury followed the law in making this decision? 
 
 Yes  ____ No  ____ Do not know  ____ 
 
4. The jury hears evidence that the defendant was well-behaved as a boy. They also 
believe that this is mitigating evidence. However, one juror notes that being a 
good child is not one of the mitigating circumstances that the judge specifically 
mentioned. For this reason, she concludes that she cannot consider this as a 
mitigating circumstance. 
 
 Has the juror followed the law in making her decision? 
 
 Yes  ____ No  ____ Do not know  ____ 
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5. The jury finds the existence of three aggravating circumstances and only two 
mitigating circumstances. Since the jury counted more aggravating circumstances 
than mitigating circumstances, the jury votes to impose the death penalty. 
 
 Has the jury followed the law in making this decision? 
 
 Yes  ____ No  ____ Do not know  ____ 
 
6. One juror decides from the evidence that the defendant cooperated with the 
police. The same juror decides that the defendant's cooperation is a mitigating 
circumstance. The other eleven jurors argue that such cooperation cannot be 
considered since they do not all agree that it is a mitigating circumstance. The one 
juror decides to consider the defendant's cooperation with the police as a 
mitigating circumstance, despite the disagreement with the other eleven jurors. 
 
 Has the juror followed the law in making his decision? 
 
 Yes  ____ No  ____ Do not know  ____ 
 
7. Every juror agrees that the defendant was mentally disturbed at the time of the 
crime. The jurors also agree that this is a mitigating circumstance. However, not 
all jurors agree that this mitigating circumstance outweighs the aggravating 
circumstances they have found. The jury therefore votes unanimously to impose 
the death penalty. 
  
 Has the jury followed the law in making this decision? 
 
 Yes  ____ No  ____ Do not know  ____ 
 
8. The jury hears evidence that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or 
cruel. Being especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel is an aggravating circumstance 
under the statute. However, the jury does not believe that the cruelty of the crime 
has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury therefore does not consider 
the cruelty of the crime as an aggravating circumstance.  
 
 Has the jury followed the law in making this decision? 
 
 Yes  ____ No  ____ Do not know  ____ 
 
9. A juror believes that the mitigating circumstance of the defendant being mentally 
retarded outweighs the aggravating circumstances. He is the only juror to feel this 
way, and because of his feelings he votes to impose a life sentence. 
 
 Has the juror followed the law in making his decision? 
 
 Yes  ____ No  ____ Do not know  ____ 
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10. Eleven jurors decide from the evidence that the defendant was abused as a child. 
The same eleven jurors decide that this history of child abuse is a mitigating 
circumstance. One juror disagrees that such abuse is a mitigating circumstance. 
Since the jurors cannot unanimously agree that being abused as a child is a 
mitigating circumstance, they do not consider it any further. 
 
 Has the jury followed the law in making this decision? 
 
 Yes  ____ No  ____ Do not know  ____ 
 
11. A juror decides from the evidence that the defendant had no significant history of 
prior criminal activity. The same juror concludes that this lack of prior criminal 
activity is a mitigating circumstance that outweighs the aggravating 
circumstances, and the juror votes not to impose the death penalty. 
 
 Has the juror followed the law in making this decision? 
 
 Yes  ____ No  ____ Do not know  ____ 
 
12. The instructions you read earlier contained the following sentence: 
   
  "If you unanimously determine that at least one statutory aggravating 
circumstance or several statutory aggravating circumstances have been proved by 
the State, beyond a reasonable doubt, and said circumstance or circumstances are 
not outweighed by any mitigating circumstances, the sentence shall be death." 
 
a. Given the above instructions, the jury concludes that the defendant 
must show that the mitigating evidence outweighs the aggravating 
evidence before they should impose a sentence of life. 
 
Has the jury followed the law in making its decision? 
 
Yes  ____ No  ____ Do not know  ____ 
 
b. In the course of deliberation, the jury finds both aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances but concludes that the evidence 
supporting mitigating and aggravating circumstances is of equal 
strength. 
 
 Given the above instructions, and the finding by the jury that the 
proof is equal, the jury finds that the defendant has failed to show 
that the mitigating evidence outweighs the aggravating evidence, 
and, as a result, imposes a sentence of death. 
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 Has the jury followed the law in making its decision? 
 
 Yes  ____ No  ____ Do not know  ____ 
 
13. The jury finds that one aggravating circumstance exists and that no mitigating 
circumstances exist. They therefore decide they must vote to impose a sentence of 
death. 
 
 Has the jury followed the law in making this decision? 
 
 Yes  ____ No  ____ Do not know  ____ 
 
14. One juror decides from the evidence that the defendant was good to his family. 
This one juror decides that this is a mitigating circumstance. The eleven other 
jurors disagree. They insist that no juror should consider the defendant's good 
relations with his family as a mitigating circumstance unless all twelve jurors 
agree that it is a mitigating circumstance. As a result, the one juror does not 
consider the defendant's being good to his family as a mitigating circumstance. 
 
 Has the juror followed the law in making this decision? 
 
 Yes  ____ No  ____ Do not know  ____ 
 
15. Eleven jurors believe that the defendant's mental disturbance at the time the crime 
was committed is not a mitigating circumstance. One juror believes that the 
defendant's mental disturbance is a mitigating circumstance. That same juror 
decides that the mental state of the defendant outweighs the aggravating 
circumstances found by the jury, even though none of the other jurors do. The 
juror votes for life, even though the other jurors tell him that is improper. 
 
 Has the juror followed the law in making his decision? 
 
 Yes  ____  No  ____ Do not know  ____ 
 
16. The jury unanimously agrees that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or 
cruel. They also agree that this is an aggravating circumstance, and that it is not 
outweighed by the mitigating circumstances that exist. As they interpret the 
instructions, this means they must vote to impose the death penalty, and they do 
so. 
 
 Has the jury followed the law in making this decision? 
 
 Yes  ____ No  ____ Do not know  ____ 
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17. The jury decides from the evidence that the defendant felt great remorse for 
committing the murder. They also decide that remorse is a mitigating 
circumstance, even though remorse was not one of the mitigating circumstances 
specifically mentioned by the judge. In deciding whether to impose a life sentence 
or the death penalty, they consider the defendant's remorse as a mitigating 
circumstance anyway. 
 
 Has the jury followed the law in making their decision? 
 
 Yes  ____ No  ____ Do not know  ____ 
 
18. A juror considers all the evidence and comes to the conclusion that the mitigating 
circumstances, taken together, outweigh the aggravating circumstances and that 
death is not the appropriate punishment. However, he cannot find any individual 
mitigating circumstance that outweighs the aggravating circumstances. Therefore, 
the juror votes to impose the death penalty. 
 
 Has the juror followed the law in making this decision? 
 
 Yes  ____ No  ____ Do not know  ____ 
 
19. After many hours of deliberation, the jury cannot agree on whether the sentence 
should be life or death. The jury finally tells the judge that they cannot reach a 
unanimous decision on whether to sentence the defendant to life or death. The 
judge thanks the jury for their efforts and dismisses them. What do you think will 
happen now? 
 
 a.  ____ by law, the judge has to sentence the defendant to life in prison. 
 b.  ____ by law, the judge has to sentence the defendant to death. 
 c.  ____ by law, there will have to be another jury trial to decide if the defendant 
should be sentenced to life or to death. 
 
20. From the judge's instructions, do you know what an aggravating circumstances 
[sic] is? 
 
 Yes  ____ No  ____ 
 
21. If your answer is "yes," please write down what is meant by an aggravating 
circumstance. 
 
 _____________________________________________________ 
 
 _____________________________________________________ 
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22. From the judge's instructions, do you know what a mitigating circumstance is? 
 
 Yes  ____ No  ____ 
 
23. If your answer is "yes," please write down what is meant by a mitigating 
circumstance. 
 
 __________________________________________________________ 
 
 __________________________________________________________ 
 
24. In order for the jury to decide that a defendant is guilty of murder, the jury has to 
be convinced of the defendant's guilt 
 
 a.  ____  beyond a reasonable doubt 
 b.  ____  by a preponderance of the evidence 
 
25. In order for the jury to decide that a defendant is guilty of murder 
 
 a.  ____  all twelve jurors have to unanimously agree that the defendant is guilty 
 b.  ____  the twelve jurors do not have to unanimously agree that the defendant is 
guilty 
 
26. Do you think a defendant sentenced to life in prison in the state of Tennessee will 
ever be paroled? 
 
 Yes  ____ No  ____ 
 
27. If you answered "yes," how many years in prison do you think a defendant 
sentenced to life will serve before being paroled? 
 
 ____ of years served in prison before being paroled. 
 
28. What is your religious preference? 
 
 ____  Protestant 
 ____  Catholic 
 ____  Jewish 
 ____  Other  ___________________ (please write in) 
 ____  None 
 
 If you checked "Protestant," please answer the next question. 
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29. What Protestant denomination do you most closely associate with? 
 
 ___________ Baptist 
 ___________ Southern Baptist 
 ___________ Church of Christ 
 ___________ Methodist 
 ___________ Lutheran (other than Missouri Synod) 
 ___________ Episcopal 
 ___________ Presbyterian 
 ___________ Other  _______________________ (please write in) 
 
30. Which best describes your political views? (Check one) 
 
 ___________ Very liberal 
 ___________ Liberal 
 ___________ Middle-of-the-road 
 ___________ Conservative 
 ___________ Very conservative 
 
31. In which one of the following groups did your total family income, from all 
sources, fall last year before taxes? 
 
 Under $5,000 
 $5,000-$9,999 
 $10,000-$19,999 
 $20,000-$29,999 
 $30,000-$39,999 
 $40,000-$49,999 
 $50,000-$59,999 
 $60,000-$69,999 
 $70,000 and over 
 
32. Did you find the judge's instructions difficult to understand? 
 
 Very difficult 
 Somewhat difficult 
 Somewhat easy 
 Very easy 
 
 
Thank you very much for your participation. Please feel free to write any comments 
below about the instructions or any other part of this survey. 
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